Despite the end of active conflict between the Germanic Union and the Japanese Empire in 1965 (33 DR), the Reich continued to act covertly against the Umezu Shogunate. Working with various groups within the new state, Germany found numerous allies to weaken General Umezu's power base eroding the future threat he represented to the German satellite of China.
Germany would arm and support forces under such men as Sukarno and Chin Peng despite the latter's communist stance. Due to their poor training (with increasing numbers of troops coming from the native population), Umezu's Japanese army was able to contain numerous uprisings and prevent gains by the guerillas. Deciding he needed to quash these rebellions before they became worse, he began to actively wipe out those villages he viewed as bases for guerillas rapidly turning the countryside against him. Volunteers in the thousands began swelling the ranks of the guerillas. These rebels began using wave attacks, sending waves of troops against the Japanese forces until they broke through. Even though the casualties were high, the guerillas began to gain ground and force the Japanese back.
Umezu resorted to desperate tactics in the face of the turning tide. Poison gas, artificial famine, death camps, and more began to reshape the war. Within the first two years, 20% of the population in Umezu's empire had perished. For the Indonesians, the war gradually began to take on religious implications as they saw their struggle not simply to be for independence but survival itself against the darkest forces on Earth. Islamic faith galvanized the disparate Indonesian forces into a single unit bent on jihad. The fanaticism of these holy warriors unnerved even the Japanese in their willingness to die for victory.
By 1969 (37 DR), Umezu had lost control of Sumatra, Java, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan. New Guinea saw fierce fighting that devastated the island and wiped out the native population becoming nothing more than a garrison for Umezu's troops. Claims of genocide were thrown at the Shogunate's forces which it staunchly denied.
In 1970 (38 DR), the Philippines successfully seceded from the Shogunate following an unsuccessful offensive by Umezu to retake Sumatra. Reeling from defeat, his forces tied down, the relatively unoccupied Philippines saw their chance for independence. German and Chinese troops quickly moved in to support this declaration of secession from the Shogunate. With the loss of the Philippines, Umezu's forces in New Guinea were cut off. Under relentless attack by Indonesian guerilla forces, the island would surrender within several months.
Meanwhile, the Khabuankarn Seri Thai movement had begun to deal major damage to the Shogunate's industrial sector via sabotage of important factories and mines. This was only the beginning. Plans were already underway for an uprising across the whole of Siam. These Thai plans relied heavily on the success of a quick, surprise strike by a special police unit against the Japanese command structure. The residences of ten leading officers and Japanese communications facilities were under surveillance. The police assault would be coordinated with a general attack by the partly-mechanised Thai 1st Army against the Japanese army in Bangkok. Fortifications, in the guise of air raid shelters, had been dug at key street intersections in the city and additional troops had been transferred to the capital in small groups, dressed in civilian clothes. The task of Thai forces elsewhere in the country would be to interfere with Japanese efforts to reinforce their Bangkok garrison by cutting communications lines and seizing airfields.
Given this reliance on surprise, Pridi had to take into account the fact that the Japanese were building up their forces in Siam to serve as an invasion force to retake Indonesia as well as to clamp down on guerilla operations in Siam. Although previously most of the Japanese forces stationed permanently in Siam had been support troops, the local command had been upgraded from garrison status to field army in December 1970 (38 DR).
To meet the need for officers to lead Thai forces in the attempted coup, Pridi and his allies devised a clever plan for an officer-training programme, taking advantage of a desire on the part of the feared Japanese Kempeitai to have the Thais set up a parallel military police unit. Pridi assigned a loyal supporter, Admiral Sangvara Suwannacheep, to head this organization in January 1971 (39 DR). In March, Sangvara recruited a contagion of approximately three hundred male students. Sangvara, who spoke some Japanese and frequently met with Kempeitai officers, sold the new training programme to his counterparts as preparation to resist insurgencies by the Indonesians. Japanese dignitaries, including the local commander, General Akeo Nakamura, participated in the launching of the programme in April. Japanese propagandists shot film of the recruits, who were ostensibly preparing to defend the Shogunate.
By September 1971 (39 DR), following the beginning of Umezu's campaign to take Sumatra, Pridi gave the order to commence the uprising. The initial part of the uprising was a startling success. Several leading Japanese officers were captured by Thai forces and numerous communication facilities and airfields were either sabotaged or seized from Imperial forces in the chaotic opening hours. However, things began to quickly shift. Despite their early successes, the Thai 1st Army bogged down in its assault on Japanese forces in Bangkok due to its green officer corps. Both forces quickly found themselves in the hell of urban combat. Fighting would last for weeks leading to the decimation of parts of the city. Elsewhere, Umezu sent reinforcements originally earmarked for Indonesia to reclaim airfields and counterattack Thai forces. The situation soon became much worse as Vietnamese guerillas, aided by the Chinese, assaulted Umezu's rear. Umezu found himself in an untenable position. To hold Siam, he would have to sacrifice Indochina. With the majority of his industry in Siam, Umezu did just that withdrawing his forces and ceding the eastern slice of Indochina to the Vietnamese. Within six months, the Thai uprising had largely been crushed.
When the Imperial Staff discovered that Umezu was planning yet another offensive at retaking Sumatra, the general was assassinated. The succeeding general, Hiroshi Tokugawa, decided it was time to formalize what was a reality. Peace treaties were signed recognizing the independence of the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam. With that, the conflict came to a close. Learning from the lessons of the collapse of Japanese strength in Southeast Asia, Tokugawa initiated a program to fully indoctrinate those peoples within the Shogunate rather than to keep them at a distance as Umezu had. This meant the adoption of the Japanese language, customs, names, and more. He would forcibly make the subjects of his rule Japanese to prevent future uprisings, binding them to him and his troops culturally and spiritually. In order to make this more palatable, he raised the living standard of citizens, offering free basic education, socialized medicine, and more.
Germany would arm and support forces under such men as Sukarno and Chin Peng despite the latter's communist stance. Due to their poor training (with increasing numbers of troops coming from the native population), Umezu's Japanese army was able to contain numerous uprisings and prevent gains by the guerillas. Deciding he needed to quash these rebellions before they became worse, he began to actively wipe out those villages he viewed as bases for guerillas rapidly turning the countryside against him. Volunteers in the thousands began swelling the ranks of the guerillas. These rebels began using wave attacks, sending waves of troops against the Japanese forces until they broke through. Even though the casualties were high, the guerillas began to gain ground and force the Japanese back.
Umezu resorted to desperate tactics in the face of the turning tide. Poison gas, artificial famine, death camps, and more began to reshape the war. Within the first two years, 20% of the population in Umezu's empire had perished. For the Indonesians, the war gradually began to take on religious implications as they saw their struggle not simply to be for independence but survival itself against the darkest forces on Earth. Islamic faith galvanized the disparate Indonesian forces into a single unit bent on jihad. The fanaticism of these holy warriors unnerved even the Japanese in their willingness to die for victory.
By 1969 (37 DR), Umezu had lost control of Sumatra, Java, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan. New Guinea saw fierce fighting that devastated the island and wiped out the native population becoming nothing more than a garrison for Umezu's troops. Claims of genocide were thrown at the Shogunate's forces which it staunchly denied.
In 1970 (38 DR), the Philippines successfully seceded from the Shogunate following an unsuccessful offensive by Umezu to retake Sumatra. Reeling from defeat, his forces tied down, the relatively unoccupied Philippines saw their chance for independence. German and Chinese troops quickly moved in to support this declaration of secession from the Shogunate. With the loss of the Philippines, Umezu's forces in New Guinea were cut off. Under relentless attack by Indonesian guerilla forces, the island would surrender within several months.
Meanwhile, the Khabuankarn Seri Thai movement had begun to deal major damage to the Shogunate's industrial sector via sabotage of important factories and mines. This was only the beginning. Plans were already underway for an uprising across the whole of Siam. These Thai plans relied heavily on the success of a quick, surprise strike by a special police unit against the Japanese command structure. The residences of ten leading officers and Japanese communications facilities were under surveillance. The police assault would be coordinated with a general attack by the partly-mechanised Thai 1st Army against the Japanese army in Bangkok. Fortifications, in the guise of air raid shelters, had been dug at key street intersections in the city and additional troops had been transferred to the capital in small groups, dressed in civilian clothes. The task of Thai forces elsewhere in the country would be to interfere with Japanese efforts to reinforce their Bangkok garrison by cutting communications lines and seizing airfields.
Given this reliance on surprise, Pridi had to take into account the fact that the Japanese were building up their forces in Siam to serve as an invasion force to retake Indonesia as well as to clamp down on guerilla operations in Siam. Although previously most of the Japanese forces stationed permanently in Siam had been support troops, the local command had been upgraded from garrison status to field army in December 1970 (38 DR).
To meet the need for officers to lead Thai forces in the attempted coup, Pridi and his allies devised a clever plan for an officer-training programme, taking advantage of a desire on the part of the feared Japanese Kempeitai to have the Thais set up a parallel military police unit. Pridi assigned a loyal supporter, Admiral Sangvara Suwannacheep, to head this organization in January 1971 (39 DR). In March, Sangvara recruited a contagion of approximately three hundred male students. Sangvara, who spoke some Japanese and frequently met with Kempeitai officers, sold the new training programme to his counterparts as preparation to resist insurgencies by the Indonesians. Japanese dignitaries, including the local commander, General Akeo Nakamura, participated in the launching of the programme in April. Japanese propagandists shot film of the recruits, who were ostensibly preparing to defend the Shogunate.
By September 1971 (39 DR), following the beginning of Umezu's campaign to take Sumatra, Pridi gave the order to commence the uprising. The initial part of the uprising was a startling success. Several leading Japanese officers were captured by Thai forces and numerous communication facilities and airfields were either sabotaged or seized from Imperial forces in the chaotic opening hours. However, things began to quickly shift. Despite their early successes, the Thai 1st Army bogged down in its assault on Japanese forces in Bangkok due to its green officer corps. Both forces quickly found themselves in the hell of urban combat. Fighting would last for weeks leading to the decimation of parts of the city. Elsewhere, Umezu sent reinforcements originally earmarked for Indonesia to reclaim airfields and counterattack Thai forces. The situation soon became much worse as Vietnamese guerillas, aided by the Chinese, assaulted Umezu's rear. Umezu found himself in an untenable position. To hold Siam, he would have to sacrifice Indochina. With the majority of his industry in Siam, Umezu did just that withdrawing his forces and ceding the eastern slice of Indochina to the Vietnamese. Within six months, the Thai uprising had largely been crushed.
When the Imperial Staff discovered that Umezu was planning yet another offensive at retaking Sumatra, the general was assassinated. The succeeding general, Hiroshi Tokugawa, decided it was time to formalize what was a reality. Peace treaties were signed recognizing the independence of the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam. With that, the conflict came to a close. Learning from the lessons of the collapse of Japanese strength in Southeast Asia, Tokugawa initiated a program to fully indoctrinate those peoples within the Shogunate rather than to keep them at a distance as Umezu had. This meant the adoption of the Japanese language, customs, names, and more. He would forcibly make the subjects of his rule Japanese to prevent future uprisings, binding them to him and his troops culturally and spiritually. In order to make this more palatable, he raised the living standard of citizens, offering free basic education, socialized medicine, and more.
The final cost of the conflict proved staggering. Fully 60% of Southeast Asia's population had been wiped out over seven years of war via battle, death camps, slave labor, disease, and starvation. The financial cost was in the billions. Despite their new freedom, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam would fail to economically recover in the wake of the war. The Shogunate alone would find economic growth which it would use to gradually re-exert its authority over the region.
SOURCE: Kaigo, Shitzu Umezu's Hubris: The War of Southeast Asia
SOURCE: Kaigo, Shitzu Umezu's Hubris: The War of Southeast Asia
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