Prelude to Battle
Yamamoto is uncertain if American forces are taking the bait as he and his naval forces make way for Midway. This would change following Operation K. A night reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor by Kawanishi flying boats from Kwajalein on March 31, 1942 find no American carriers, confirming for the Yamamoto that the American Admiral Chester Nimitz was trying to counter his moves as the Japanese closed on Midway.
The Opening Phase of Midway
Yamamoto set a submarine picket line between Hawaii and Midway. These forces would catch a glimpse of Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance’s carriers moving towards the battle area on April 2 providing early warning of the American approach. Admiral Nagumo responds by having all his escort craft float planes in the air before dawn searching determinedly for the enemy; his air groups would be primed on deck, ready to strike at the first opportunity.
A report locating Nagumo’s force from a Midway-based PBY Catalina flying boat comes in just as Task Force 16’s radar picks up what may be incoming Japanese planes. Spruance, himself expecting and seeking contact, launches his own strike at this target. Ray Spruance does this despite the position of the enemy fleet being beyond the round-trip range of many American aircraft; he will attempt to close the distance on their return trip, he tells them, knowing that many will have no chance to make it back. The fighters of TF-16’s Combat Air Patrol, those not sent as escorts on the attack, meet the incoming enemy courageously, but they are knocked aside as Japanese Zeroes engage them aggressively, downing many using their superior maneuverability to screen the Americans from the slower bombers. Few of the attacking bombers are turned aside before they reach the frantically turning American flattops. Within ten minutes, despite the desperate efforts of every antiaircraft gunner in the fleet, torpedoes have rammed home on both beams of the Enterprise. The carrier is ablaze from several large holes on her flight deck. TF-16 is out of action; losses among the attackers are moderate. Heroic attacks and frantic actions still lie ahead.
The Second Phase
Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher and the Yorktown, core of TF-17, learn of the sighting of Japanese carriers and want to join the action, but he is not yet close enough to participate. His planes ready to go, and making flank speed to the west, he then gets the terrible news from Spruance of his ship’s condition.
Jack Fletcher knows that Vice Admiral “Bull” Halsey would have hurled himself into battle, but he is not “Bull” Halsey, likely to act before considering all the ramifications; nor can he easily abandon Spruance to an unanswered second strike from Nagumo. It is still midmorning. Fletcher believes he has escaped detection and can get a blow in before the enemy finds him, evening up the score. Fletcher makes the decision to sail west, rather than turn back for Pearl, hoping to narrow the range on Nagumo. A scout plane from the Japanese cruiser Tone, on its homeward leg, detects him. Fletcher launches Yorktown’s planes when he gets reports of “enemy carriers,” perhaps to catch Nagumo recovering his aircraft. America’s last hope make their way to Mobile Force’s previous location, but can only find a crippled Kaga limping westward, escorted by two destroyers. Despite searching frantically for Nagumo’s ships, which have made a sharp turn to the north to recover, they can find no fresh targets. The flight groups from Yorktown overwhelm the damaged Japanese carrier, dispatching her and one of her escorts in frustration.
Midway Island in range, Nagumo’s planes from the Mobile Fleet reduce the island’s airbase to rubble, its aircraft burned or expended in futile efforts to sink fast ships at sea. Midway is then pummeled by the big guns of the Support Group’s cruisers and then even the Main Force battleships under Admiral Yamamoto himself, hurling 16 and 18.1 inch shells against coral. The American garrison, even reinforced as it is, can hardly resist for long unsupported, once Japanese troops are ashore. It proves a bloody affair and a formidable warning for Japan of the dangers inherent in making opposed landings against the U.S. Marines in base-defense mode; the garrison adds “Midway” to the name of “The Alamo,” “Wake,” and “Bataan” in America’s hagiography of last stands.
Admiral Chester Nimitz finds himself with just a single carrier in the Pacific: Saratoga, just in from San Diego. Halsey wants to steam off directly toward the enemy, “catch ‘em gloating,” as he puts it, but Nimitz is aware that the strategic defense he had planned has been ruined by his own impetuosity. He had gone on a hunch, but it was a very thin strand that had held it all together. There never seemed to be any consideration of whether the Japanese might have guessed his plans. Most of the fleet had been risked and now it was gone. How could expert strategic intelligence have produced such a catastrophic defeat? How could he have guessed right and still be defeated?
SOURCE: Dietrich, Robert Point Luck: The American Tragedy of Midway
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