The Fall of Konoe

In Siberia, Vlassov saw Japanese forces cross the Ussuri River in late May 1941. Following the collapse of Russian forces at Khabarovsk and the fall of Vladivostok, the Russian Army was rent through with pessimism and thoroughly demoralized. Not even stories of rape and murder filtering out of the occupied Far East could fire up their souls. Vlassov needed a victory to save his country. Desperate, he committed his final reserves of aircraft and armor to stop the Japanese drive at Irkutsk in mid-June. Japanese forces, overextended and overconfident, found themselves surprised. Japanese armor had failed to keep up with the infantry, breaking down along the rough terrian, their fuel tanks running dry as their supply line was stretched thin. Japanese aircraft also lagged behind, waiting for new airfields to be built to accomodate them. Caught off guard without air or armor support, the Japanese suffered heavy casualties. The Japanese drive once more stalled. With Russian survival feasible for the foreseeable future, Dewey had American military aid increased to Vlassov's government.

Back in Japan, the Imperial Staff continued to plan for war with the United States. While the Emperor received detailed reports from Sugiyama and Nagano about the planned operations in the South Pacific and the attack of Pearl Harbor, Prime Minister Konoe made one last desperate attempt to avoid war. That very evening, he arranged a secret dinner conference with the US Ambassador to Japan. Konoe told the ambassador that he was prepared to travel to meet Dewey on a moment's notice. The ship had already been prepared. He was convinced that the United States and Japan could reach a true agreement, and when that happened, he would radio back to the palace, and the Emperor would issue a rescript ordering a complete halt to all aggressive activities.

The US Ambassador was impressed with Konoe's sincerity. He cabled back, urging his superiors to advise Dewey to accept the summit proposal. The State Department continued to think that an open-ended summit was a waste of time. If Japan were serious, it would begin meaningful and detailed negotiations that would be affirmed at a summit. Konoe's last push for a diplomatic solution was taken in vain.

Throughout July the Army and Navy continued to prepare for war. Konoe had hoped that the August deadline would not be observed. The Army and Navy leaders disabused him of this notion. Japan had to act soon, because of the oil embargo. Otherwise it would be conceding defeat through delay. Also, American aid had to be cut off if Japan was to break through and finish off Russian forces. War with America had become inevitable in their eyes. This came to a head at a cabinet meeting on August 14. Army Minister Tojo Hideki stated that negotiations had failed, the deadline had passed. Konoe and his allies had become convinced that if the Army would only agree, in principle, to an ultimate withdrawal from China and SIberia, a negotiated settlement could be reached with the US. This was brought up at the meeting and General Tojo responded heatedly:

To yield to the American demand and withdraw their troops, he exploded, would wipe out all the fruits of the Chinese and Russian Wars, endanger Manchukuo, and jeopardize the governing of Korea. To accept troop withdrawal in name only would not benefit Japan either, he said. Withdrawal would mean retreat. It would depress morale. A demoralized Army would be as worthless as no Army. Our troops in China and Russia are the "heart of the matter," he persisted. Having made one concession after another, why should Japan now yield the "heart?" "If we concede this, what is diplomacy? It is surrender … a stain on the history of our empire!"

At the close of this meeting, Konoe realized that he had lost the struggle with the military. He knew that many in the Navy were convinced that war with the United States would end in disaster. Yet he was not able to win Navy backing against the adamant Army stance. Navy Admiral Nagano summed up his service's ambivalent attitude during this period by observing "The government has decided that if there is no war, the fate of the nation is sealed. Even if there is a war, the country may be ruined. Nevertheless, a nation that does not fight in this plight has lost its spirit and is doomed."
Konoe resigned on 16 August 1941, one day after having recommended Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni to the emperor as his successor. Two days later, Hirohito chose General Hideki Tōjō as Prime Minister despite the wish of the Navy and the Army, who would have preferred Prince Higashikuni. In 1946, he explained this decision : "I actually thought Prince Higashikuni suitable as chief of staff of the Army; but I think the appointment of a member of the imperial house to a political office must be considered very carefully. Above all, in time of peace this is fine, but when there is a fear that there may even be a war, then more importantly, considering the welfare of the imperial house, I wonder about the wisdom of a member of the imperial family serving [as prime minister]." Six weeks later, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.

Konoe justified his demission to his secretary Kenji Tomita. "Of course his Majesty is a pacifist and he wished to avoid war. When I told him that to initiate war was a mistake, he agreed. But the next day, he would tell me : 'You were worried about it yesterday but you do not have to worry so much.' Thus, gradually he began to lead to war. And the next time I met him, he leaned even more to war. I felt the Emperor was telling me: 'My prime minister does not understand military matters. I know much more.' In short, the Emperor had absorbed the view of the army and the navy high commands."

SOURCE: The Legacy of Konoe