The Fall of Konoe

In Siberia, Vlassov saw Japanese forces cross the Ussuri River in late May 1941. Following the collapse of Russian forces at Khabarovsk and the fall of Vladivostok, the Russian Army was rent through with pessimism and thoroughly demoralized. Not even stories of rape and murder filtering out of the occupied Far East could fire up their souls. Vlassov needed a victory to save his country. Desperate, he committed his final reserves of aircraft and armor to stop the Japanese drive at Irkutsk in mid-June. Japanese forces, overextended and overconfident, found themselves surprised. Japanese armor had failed to keep up with the infantry, breaking down along the rough terrian, their fuel tanks running dry as their supply line was stretched thin. Japanese aircraft also lagged behind, waiting for new airfields to be built to accomodate them. Caught off guard without air or armor support, the Japanese suffered heavy casualties. The Japanese drive once more stalled. With Russian survival feasible for the foreseeable future, Dewey had American military aid increased to Vlassov's government.

Back in Japan, the Imperial Staff continued to plan for war with the United States. While the Emperor received detailed reports from Sugiyama and Nagano about the planned operations in the South Pacific and the attack of Pearl Harbor, Prime Minister Konoe made one last desperate attempt to avoid war. That very evening, he arranged a secret dinner conference with the US Ambassador to Japan. Konoe told the ambassador that he was prepared to travel to meet Dewey on a moment's notice. The ship had already been prepared. He was convinced that the United States and Japan could reach a true agreement, and when that happened, he would radio back to the palace, and the Emperor would issue a rescript ordering a complete halt to all aggressive activities.

The US Ambassador was impressed with Konoe's sincerity. He cabled back, urging his superiors to advise Dewey to accept the summit proposal. The State Department continued to think that an open-ended summit was a waste of time. If Japan were serious, it would begin meaningful and detailed negotiations that would be affirmed at a summit. Konoe's last push for a diplomatic solution was taken in vain.

Throughout July the Army and Navy continued to prepare for war. Konoe had hoped that the August deadline would not be observed. The Army and Navy leaders disabused him of this notion. Japan had to act soon, because of the oil embargo. Otherwise it would be conceding defeat through delay. Also, American aid had to be cut off if Japan was to break through and finish off Russian forces. War with America had become inevitable in their eyes. This came to a head at a cabinet meeting on August 14. Army Minister Tojo Hideki stated that negotiations had failed, the deadline had passed. Konoe and his allies had become convinced that if the Army would only agree, in principle, to an ultimate withdrawal from China and SIberia, a negotiated settlement could be reached with the US. This was brought up at the meeting and General Tojo responded heatedly:

To yield to the American demand and withdraw their troops, he exploded, would wipe out all the fruits of the Chinese and Russian Wars, endanger Manchukuo, and jeopardize the governing of Korea. To accept troop withdrawal in name only would not benefit Japan either, he said. Withdrawal would mean retreat. It would depress morale. A demoralized Army would be as worthless as no Army. Our troops in China and Russia are the "heart of the matter," he persisted. Having made one concession after another, why should Japan now yield the "heart?" "If we concede this, what is diplomacy? It is surrender … a stain on the history of our empire!"

At the close of this meeting, Konoe realized that he had lost the struggle with the military. He knew that many in the Navy were convinced that war with the United States would end in disaster. Yet he was not able to win Navy backing against the adamant Army stance. Navy Admiral Nagano summed up his service's ambivalent attitude during this period by observing "The government has decided that if there is no war, the fate of the nation is sealed. Even if there is a war, the country may be ruined. Nevertheless, a nation that does not fight in this plight has lost its spirit and is doomed."
Konoe resigned on 16 August 1941, one day after having recommended Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni to the emperor as his successor. Two days later, Hirohito chose General Hideki Tōjō as Prime Minister despite the wish of the Navy and the Army, who would have preferred Prince Higashikuni. In 1946, he explained this decision : "I actually thought Prince Higashikuni suitable as chief of staff of the Army; but I think the appointment of a member of the imperial house to a political office must be considered very carefully. Above all, in time of peace this is fine, but when there is a fear that there may even be a war, then more importantly, considering the welfare of the imperial house, I wonder about the wisdom of a member of the imperial family serving [as prime minister]." Six weeks later, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.

Konoe justified his demission to his secretary Kenji Tomita. "Of course his Majesty is a pacifist and he wished to avoid war. When I told him that to initiate war was a mistake, he agreed. But the next day, he would tell me : 'You were worried about it yesterday but you do not have to worry so much.' Thus, gradually he began to lead to war. And the next time I met him, he leaned even more to war. I felt the Emperor was telling me: 'My prime minister does not understand military matters. I know much more.' In short, the Emperor had absorbed the view of the army and the navy high commands."

SOURCE: The Legacy of Konoe

The Path to a Pacific War

Many questions have arisen as to why the Japanese invaded Russia (Operation Haichi-Go) with an ongoing conflict in China as well as American pressure not to intervene in Siberia. The leading theory is that the Japanese believed Russia was nothing more than a corpse waiting to be dismembered, the head chopped off by the Germans and the life blood of industry, population, and raw materials bled out and lost with its European lands. Siberia held less than 30% of the Soviet Union's former population, nearly every factory was now in German hands, and the Russian Army, or what was left of it, was poorly armed. The lure of potential raw materials and land at so little cost drew Japan like the Sirens' call.

Many in the Imperial Army were sure the campaign would be over quickly and that President Dewey of the United States would not intervene in their affairs, much like his predecessor, President Garner. Garner, being a staunch isolationist, was against any involvement in Asia despite Congress' constant attempts to intervene throughout the Second Sino-Japanese War as stories of atrocities and threats to American investment in the region mounted. Dewey's saber rattling was perceived as a hollow threat to sate the interventionists in America. Some records have arisen corroborating this theory with many Japanese generals on record stating their belief that the whole of Siberia would fall within a month. A thorough combing of Imperial records also revealed there was little to no planning on the contingency of American intervention in Operation Haichi-Go.

Thus it came as a surprise to the Kwangtung Army when their initial drive was blunted by dug in Siberian troops. Russian soldiers are famous for their defensive capabilities as the Japanese quickly discovered. The first week of fighting along the border was brutal with the Japanese taking incredible casualties for every foot of earth. Each step forward saw Siberian forces stiffen. Despite a numerical advantage of troops (3:1) and the use of aircraft and armor, the Japanese could not shatter the Russian line.

Though the Russians were surprising the world with their resistance, their forces were beginning to crumble. Nearly half of the Russian Air Force was lost in the opening stages of the war, the remainder pulled back to protect the core of the rump Russian nation should the Japanese break through. Russian armor, meanwhile, proved useless as fuel stocks quickly ran dry and resupply proved impossible. Vlassov knew there was no way to defeat the Japanese offensively. He could only hope to bleed the Japs and pray that the American embargo would make future attacks untenable. He sacrificed men and land for time.

With the failure of the opening week, many in the Imperial Staff were afraid they had found themselves in another China. Siberia had seemingly become another meat grinder into which Japanese soldiers were lost. The situation was further exacerbated by the American oil embargo. With stocks of oil limited, the campaign had to be settled quickly. Incredible solutions were offered to successfully conclude the war from the use of gas to biological weapons. The most radical approach of all was a proposal of diplomacy with America made by the Prime Minister. For once, the Imperial Staff was inclined to listen.

Japanese Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe felt pressure from the Imperial Staff to find some solution to the debacle they had bumbled into. Already, the Imperial Staff were putting together a plan to seize the Dutch East Indies to alleviate the oil problem, part of the staff certain America wouldn't end the embargo even if Siberia fell. The oil of the Indies would solve Japan's needs and make her immune to future American economic dependence. Likewise, seizure of British possessions in the region would help to create a buffer to protect against American counterattacks sure to come. British power had been waning since 1939, their colonies ripe for the taking. Also, problems continued to fester in India which Japan fostered tying up what few British troops were available. Initial victory seemed assured as there were no real forces to oppose their plan.

The very notion of assaulting the Indies and British possessions throughout the South Pacific horrified Konoe who saw such an act as likely to draw America into a war which could only end in Japan's utter devastation. The idea of launching yet another campaign while two others (China, Siberia) were ongoing, especially one that could draw the United States as an adversary, was to be avoided at all costs.

Konoe had been against the Russian invasion from the beginning, hoping instead to mend Japanese-American relations rather than gamble the destiny of his people on yet another military adventure. With detereorating conditions in China, Konoe had hoped to achieve recognition for the Wang Jingwei Government, stripping Chiang of support and possibly pushing the stubborn Generalissimo to the bargaining table so that the war could end. Garner had been deaf to such pleas, instead waiting for both sides to destroy each other and caring little for the bloodshed. With Dewey, Konoe hoped he'd found a ready ear. When the Army invaded Siberia, Konoe found his plans in tatters.

With the Imperial Staff drawing up plans for a strike likely to start war between America and Japan, Konoe made a desperate attempt to avert conflict. He proposed a personal summit with Dewey–in the United States if necessary–to come to some understanding. Konoe secured backing from the Navy and the Emperor for this move. The Army reluctantly agreed, provided that Konoe adhere to the consensus foreign policy, and be prepared to go to war if his initiative failed. Konoe secretly confided to a friend that he intended to grant concessions to the US, including withdrawal from Russia and China, using direct authority from the Emperor. His friend cautioned that he would be assassinated upon his return. Konoe agreed that this was likely, but felt that it was worth the personal risk.

Dewey played along, even though he felt that negotiations were probably a waste of time after his initial dealings with the Japanese. He also doubted that Konoe could make an agreement that was both acceptable to the US and to the militarists at home. Dewey told Ambassador Nomura that he would like to see more details of Konoe's proposal, and he suggested that Juneau, Alaska, might be a good spot for a meeting.
Meanwhile in Siberia, the strain of battle began to take its toll on Siberian troops. Repeated air attacks served to pound their nerves raw. Japanese armor would shatter them. Desperate for progress at any cost, the Japanese focused their assault at Khabarovsk in what was the first use of Japanese blitzkrieg tactics. They hoped to split the Russian line, roll up the east all the way to Vladivostok while using the Ussuri River to protect their flank, and then regroup for the push west. 29 April, Japanese forces commenced their assault. Softened up by artillery and air bombardment, the depleted Siberian ranks finally broke when Japanese armor crashed through. A sliver of Siberia was lost, the first hairline crack in Vlassov's defenses. This victory served to cool the Imperial Staff's initial interest in a diplomatic solution to the crisis. The Imperial Staff became even more averse to dealing with the United States when they found American weapons among some of the Russian soldiers' corpses.

On 5 May, Konoe met the Emperor with chiefs of staff Hajime Sugiyama and Osami Nagano. Alarmed at military officers accompanying the Prime Minister, Emperor Showa asked what happened to the negotiations with Dewey. Konoe replied that, of course, negotiations were primary, and the military option was only a fall-back position if negotiations failed. The Emperor then questioned Sugiyama about the current state of affairs in Siberia. After Sugiyama answered positively, smiling broadly as he releated the victory at Khabarovsk, Hirohito scolded him, remembering that the Army had predicted that the invasion of Russia would be completed in only one month.

The next day the policy about the preparation for war against "United States, United Kingdom, and Holland" was formally proposed at the Imperial Conference. Hara Yoshimichi, the Privy Council President, observed that the plan seemed to put military action ahead of diplomacy. Standing in for the Emperor, he asked if that was the case. There was silence. No other figure, including Konoe, attempted to answer the question.

The Emperor then stunned the gathering by speaking out. He stated that Hara's question was an important one, and that it was "regrettable" that none of the senior leaders had addressed it. He then read a verse that had been composed by the Emperor Meiji:

Throughout the world
Everywhere we are all brothers
Why then do the winds and waves rage so turbulently?

He stated that he had often reflected on this verse, which represented the Emperor Meiji's desire for peace, a desire that he shared. Stung by this unexpected rebuke, Navy Chief of Staff Nagano rose to defend the policy, assuring the Emperor that this consensus document was not a decision to go to war and that priority will be given to negotiations.

The Imperial Conference adopted the policy that would result in the attack on Pearl Harbor. The policy established a set of minimum demands that must be met through negotiations. If Konoe's negotiations did not bear fruit by mid-August, Japan would commence hostilities against the United States and the Netherlands' Pacific holdings. The minimum demands included a halt to the economic and oil embargoes, withdrawal of political support for the Chinese Nationalist government, an end to military aid for Russia, agreement to keep Western military forces in the Pacific at their current level, and non-interference in Japan's attempts to bring" peace" to China. In other words, to accept Japanese hegemony over China, Manchuria, Mongolia, Russia, Burma, and French Indo-China, and Japanese military primacy in an even broader swath of the East.

SOURCE: Dawn of the Pacific War