April 1944 - June 1944

Hitler's order to secure the industrial core of America recommenced in the spring of 1944 when Rommel drove into Ohio reaching Youngstown April 10. American forces, largely National Guard units, offered little resistance as he struck northwest towards Cleveland, taking the city on April 17, before then striking south for Akron.

Guderian's drive into Indiana was just as rapid, Elkhart falling April 13, followed by Ft. Wayne on April 19. The first signs of organized American forces appeared as he approached Muncie, April 25. The VI Corps, under Major General Ernest J. Dawley, had moved east from Illinois in late March, taking up position north of Indianapolis on April 17. When news came of Guderian's march south, Dawley prepared his forces to meet him. It was patrols of the 45th Division which first encountered Wermacht troops outside Muncie on April 25. Brief gunfire was exchanged before American forces withdrew to report German troop movements.

German and American forces would skirmish over the next three days in and around Delaware County with Guderian forcing Dawley gradually southwestward. The fourth day of fighting transpired near the White River, five miles from Yorktown. The river to his rear, Dawley found himself trapped. With a lack of decent armor, only VI Corps' artillery served to deter German charges meant to drive them into the river. This was quickly solved by Guderian's panzers which sliced through the VI's infantry and overran Dawley's main guns. Suffering heavy casualties, many American soldiers dove into the White River swimming across to the southern shore while being shot at by Wermacht rifles and panzer cannons. Scores of bodies would foul the water for weeks to come, some washing up as far as ten miles downriver.

Rommel, meanwhile, had picked up his breathtaking pace reaching Marietta, OH on April 28. There he met parts of the reconstituted II Corps, now commanded by Major General Geoffrey Keyes.

Patton, the former commander of II Corps, had been "promoted" to an inactive front, commander of III Corps at the Presidio in Monterey, CA, due to his controversial dealings with his superiors and subordinates. The press had printed some of Patton's abusive correspondence with Washington greatly angering President Dewey who wouldn't bear his authority being undermined. Dewey was sure Patton had leaked the correspondence as a way to guilt him into action on a list of complaints the general had earlier sent him. To make matters worse was Patton's slapping of a soldier suffering from shell shock following the Battle of Pittsburgh. Patton's abrasive personality drove Eisenhower to move the man as far away as possible for his own good.

Major General Keyes proved an able leader though not as skilled as Rommel who rapidly punctured the American line and rolled up part of II Corps by April 30. Only Keyes deft maneuvering kept the entire II Corps from being enveloped. Part of the reason for this defeat was attributed to II Corps' armor which stood at 65%, manned largely with inexperienced tank crews that had been rushed to the front. Among these tanks was the M5 which saw its first frontline action, performing well under fire but still inadequate against German Panthers.

The Battle of Marietta would end American support for light tanks and lead to the development of medium and heavy tanks. Rommel would complete the annihilation of II Corps over the next four days leaving only 80,000 American troops between him and Washington to the east, but the German commander turned west to link up with Guderian as ordered despite a desire to gamble for the American capital.

In Indiana, Indianapolis was encircled by Guderian April 28 and taken two days later severing a vital transportation hub in a largely bloodless offensive. Guderian would then turn southeast cutting a swath through disorganized American forces, put together piecemeal from whatever was available, on his way to the Ohio border.

Rommel and Guderian would meet in Cincinnati on May 14. Though this served as a major blow to the United States, it was only the beginning of a larger offensive.

Hitler had decided to open a second front in September 1943 following the beating Rommel had taken in Pennsylvania to relieve the pressure on German forces in New England and to put renewed pressure on the American capital. The Fuhrer looked towards a landing somewhere along the Carolina coast. Goering and Raeder would aid Hitler in his planning. What the pair offered up most were doubts.

Goering informed the Fuhrer that landings anywhere south of Virginia would be unsupported by Luftwaffe aircraft, the distance being too great from their airfields in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Raeder further warned Hitler that should the Carolina landings be successful, there was the possibility that the United States could blockade the coast using parts of the Atlantic and Pacific fleets cutting off the landing force from resupply. Up to this point, the United States had been willing to not call on the Pacific Fleet to augment their Atlantic naval forces, but the German offensive in the south could be viewed as a large enough threat to redeploy parts of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic, especially due to the lull that had settled over the west coast. Then there was the problem of landing and amphibious craft which were in short supply. There would need to be designs drawn up, raw materials allocated, workers found, etc. This didn't include the training necessary to prepare troops for the operation. The entire venture was not likely to happen in less than two years at best and even then it was still fraught with a myriad of threats of failure.

But Hitler would not be swayed. The very audacity of the plan, coupled with the fact that it would be the largest amphibious assault in history, mesmerized the German leader. When Raeder and Goering realized the futility of halting preparations, they tried to convince the Fuhrer to move the landing point further north to allow for air support. Hitler would not hear of it. First, the threat of American air forces would be minimal in the Carolinas. Naval reconnaissance had found only four to five squadrons scattered across the area, mostly used for training and coastal patrols. The Fuhrer was quick to point out to Raeder the fact that recent modifications to five merchant ships would provide the Kriegsmarine with additional escort carriers whose fighter complement added up to 30 Bf 109s. Added to the Graf Zeppelin's aircraft, that numbered 40 fighters placing the American to German fighter ratio at roughly around 2:1. German aircraft had proven its supremacy time and again and American air forces would be disorganized coming from several air fields and could, likely, be intercepted before they became a problem. Second, landing anywhere in Virginia was ridiculous with the American troop presence so close to Washington. The invasion force would quickly find itself bogged down by soldiers already on alert and then pushed back into the sea. An attack further south would face minimal opposition allowing for an easier push inland and would also serve to draw off forces opening Washington to the joint forces of Rommel and Guderian leading to the fall of the capital and the end of the United States as a coherent entity.

"American forces are broken," Hitler stated. "All it will take is one more bold stroke to shatter their resolve. Our forces will walk over them to everlasting victory!"

As to the problems of landing craft, Hitler ordered German forces to begin confiscating all merchant and commerical craft in the occupied areas of Canada and New England. They had until summer 1944. Speed and surprise was essential.

The initial phase of the operation, the combined Luftwaffe/Kriegsmarine assault on Newport News in November 1943, served to drive the Atlantic Fleet south. It would be followed by numerous sorties to keep the Atlantic Fleet away from the proposed landing zones and to allow for aerial reconnaissance of the region. With naval success on the American east coast, Hitler ordered plans for an amphibious landing at Charleston to be sped up. He would travel to Philadelphia to set up his American HQ to oversee the Atlantic Theater, coordinating with Rommel, Guderian, Manstein, Goering, and Raeder. Training for the landing was conducted throughout late winter/early spring.

30 May 1944, Raeder initiated the invasion heading south from New Jersey. American forces would be ill-equipped to counter the coming attack, lacking in men and materiel. The American General Staff had become used to Raeder's roaming up and down the east coast over the past year in what was perceived as a useless blockade. Any threat the German Admiral offered, such as shelling of coastal ports, had been kept at bay by coastal aircraft which had markedly increased in northern Virginia. Also, after having overreacted to the joint Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine attack on Newport News, and with Rommel and Guderian to their west, American commanders were not willing to divert troops to the Carolina shores. In fact, they had diverted troops north to defend against a renewed drive by the Wermacht on Washington. The American Midwest and Washington took priority. Thus, South Carolina was not prepared for the German forces that stormed her shores, having been stripped of a vast amount of divisional strength and mostly used as a training area.

The Battle of Charleston began at 0300, June 6, with a naval barrage accompanied by bombing runs by the Graf Zeppelin's Ju-87s which would render the air strips at Myrtle Beach and Charleston Army Air Fields useless, grounding their squadrons and stripping air supremacy from American forces.
121,000 Wermacht troops ran ashore over the next five hours starting at 0630 in a motley collection of cruise ships, steamers, and other craft overwhelming limited American resistance in what quickly became a debacle for the American High Command. By the time USAAF air support could be called from nearby air fields in Florence and Charlotte, German troops had secured their beachheads and were driving inland. When USAAF forces arrived on the scene, what they found was mass panic. Numerous civilians clogged the roads trying to escape the German drive. What they did not know was that aircraft from the Graf Zeppelin and her escort carriers had been strafing and bombing American civilians in their exodus causing mass panic.

The German invasion of Charleston was only part of the Operation. Following the success of their spring campaign, Rommel and Guderian used the bulk of their forces to stab into West Virginia in a drive aimed at Washington itself meant to divert troops and attention away from South Carolina prior to the amphibious landings. This drive commenced in mid-May and reached as far as Moorefield, WV by June 6. Surprised by the ease of their eastward assault, Rommel and Guderian decided to press further than planned. The first line of defenses surrounding Washington would be shattered three days later.

Washington was in a panic. They had no immediate forces to counter the invasion in South Carolina, Rommel was less than thirty miles away, and the threat of losing the entire east coast was fast becoming a reality. Many voiced the opinion that Washington should be abandoned so that American forces could then focus on crushing the German forces at Charleston while maintaining a coherent defense against German forces from the north. President Dewey refused to abandon the capital citing its symbolic nature. Instead, he ordered that all forces in Virginia be focused on defending the capital while the fleet was to solve the problem in Carolina. Parts of the Pacific Fleet would be diverted east in the weeks to come while the bulk of the Atlantic Fleet was told to move north and engage the Kriegsmarine.

Admiral King issued the command for the Atlantic Fleet to remove the Kriegsmarine from the Carolina coast that the Wermacht in Charleston could be cut off and captured by I Corps. The decisive battle of the Atlantic unfolded June 12 between the Atlantic Fleet and the Kriegsmarine. Raeder was ordered by Hitler himself to hold his position at all costs. Raeder's naval aviators held the sky against American aircraft. The majority of the USAAF pilots were still trainees and quickly overwhelmed by the German aces who tore them apart. The two navies pounded one another across the sea taking numerous casualties. While Ju 87s and Fi 167s rained fire from above, Uboats attacked from the depths. Le Malin class destroyers glided through the churning waters blasting holes in American naval craft with elegant efficiency. Fiery pyres littered the ocean blazing brightly along the horizon.
American naval forces fought on despite their losses, realizing that South Carolina was likely lost if they retreated. Their determination was heroic and shocking to the German sailors who witnessed it. One remarkable event was the ramming of an American cruiser into one of the German escort carriers. Despite their efforts, they were overcome by the Kriegsmarine. Raeder pressed in for the kill virtually decimating the remains of the Atlantic Fleet as it finally turned to retreat south. The Grand Admiral would send his Uboats after them as he took up position off the coast.

SOURCE: Wilder, George Hitler's Great Gamble: The Amphibious Invasion of Charleston

The Twin German Drives and an Atlantic Threat

Adolf Hitler flew to the Wermacht's Canadian HQ in March 1943 to meet with Field Marshal von Manstein to discuss the future of their American campaign. With American forces in disarray, Manstein was ordered by Hitler to split his forces for a drive west to capture Ottawa and a drive south towards New York City. Hitler believed that the fall of their capital would knock the Candians out of the war while the capture of NYC would serve a heavy blow to the American economy and cut off Massachussetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island which the Kriegsmarine could then effectively blockade. A subsequent use for Ottawa was for an eventual drive south past Toronto into Michigan aimed at Detroit. As to the future of the New York drive, Hitler intended to first mop up American forces in Massachussetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island and then push southwest toward Pittsburgh.

Manstein balked at splitting his forces when success was being achieved along the east coast. Manstein instead wanted to focus on a drive south aimed at Pittsburgh and then west into Ohio, Indiana, and finally Michigan. Hitler retorted that his plan was one giant pincer movement rather than a vulnerable scythe-like sweep. With success on the east coast and success in Michigan, the Wermacht could envelop Indiana and Ohio without a risk to its flanks. Also, Hitler's plan allowed for Detroit being captured early depriving America of one of its most important industrial and transportation hubs. It would also create a large pocket preventing a sizable number of American forces from escaping across the Mississippi River. Manstein would relent in the face of Hitler's adamant views. Rommel would be tasked with the drive south aimed at New York and then Pittsburgh. The drive west was given to Guderian. Manstein did this despite the protests of the General Staff. He realized the talents of Guderian and was not going to have them squandered by sycophants.

Loathed by the OKH for his independent streak and blunt language, Guderian had garned few allies in the upper echelons of German military authority. But the man got results and that was enough to keep his detractors at bay though promotion was another problem. Guderian realized the opportunity Manstein had given him and seized it with great enthusiasm. At the outset of his drive west, Guderian was surprised at the rapid progress he made. Canadian and American forces proved unable to counter his drive, their tanks poorly designed and their leadership amateurish. He would describe Allied battle techniques as blunt, savage, and simple using numbers to overwhelm and counter his forces when they could not outthink him. He also cited their lack of discipline, some units effectively crumbling at the thundering advance of his panzers. If not for supply problems, Guderian stated he could have taken Ottawa in two months. Instead, he would reach the Canadian capital by late August. PM King would declare it an open city. Following news of the Blitz in New York, King refused to have Ottawa's citizens suffer while the city was reduced to ruins. Hitler heaped great praise and awards on Guderian for his successful drive. The Fuhrer's lauding quickly turned to condemnation when PM King declared Canada would fight on.
Rommel's drive into the United States, meanwhile, intially met with the same success as Guderian. Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont fell within a month as Rommel and his Ghost Divisions stormed through New England. He entered New York via Granville on May 12. Meanwhile, there was a shake up of command in the American Army ranks.

Following the defeats of the U.S. II Corps by the Wermacht in the Canadian Campaign, General Dwight D. "Ike" Eisenhower wanted an assessment of the corps. After the losses of New Brunswick and the retreat into Maine, Eisenhower sent Major-General Omar Bradley to observe the conditions of the II Corps operationally.

On 16 April 1943, as a result of Bradley's report, Patton replaced Major-General Lloyd Fredendall as commander of the II Corps. Patton was also promoted to Lieutenant-General. Soon thereafter, Patton had Bradley reassigned to his Corps Command as deputy commander.

Tough in his training, Patton was generally unpopular with his troops. However, they preferred to serve with him because they thought he was their best chance to get home alive. US officers had noted the "softness" and lack of discipline in the II Corps under Fredendall. Patton required all personnel to wear steel helmets, even physicians in the operating wards, and required his troops to wear the unpopular lace-up leggings and neckties. A system of fines was introduced to ensure all personnel shaved daily and observed other uniform requirements. While these measures did not make Patton popular, they did tend to restore a sense of discipline and unit pride that may have been missing earlier. In a play on his nickname, troops joked that it was "his guts and our blood".

The discipline Patton required paid off quickly. Realizing Rommel's willingness to drive ahead brashly, Patton had his troops surrender ground in Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont to stretch Rommel's supply line, drawing him in and leaving him vulnerable on the flanks. By mid-May 1943, the counter-offensive of the U.S. II Corps began. At the Battle of Troy, Rommel was surprised by American forces. Patton pressed from the northwest threatening Rommel's flank using prototype bazookas to help him even the odds against German panzers, sowing confusion among the Wermacht's ranks. Only desperate action, personally led by himself, prevented Rommel from being cut off. The use of the 88s withering fire barely forced American armor back, sometimes at a distance of only fifty yards in what amounted to virtual hand to hand fighting. Patton sent wave after wave against the German line threatening a breakthrough at several points. Patton's success would be cut short. Luftwaffe forces were diverted from their assault on New York City to aid Rommel. With total air supremacy, the Luftwaffe straffed II Corps mercilessly sending the American drive into disarray. Patton would become legendary for standing up in his jeep at the approach of a Messerschmitt Bf 109 and pulling his pistol in a showdown. Soldiers watched in awe as the plane missed, Patton firing and cursing the pilot as he soared away.

Reluctantly, Patton withdrew to reorganize and plan. Rommel gained a great deal of respect for the general who blunted his drive and the American troops who proved their willingness and ability to fight. The German commander would not underestimate American military strength again.

Over the next two months, the generals would spar throughout New York until a decisive showdown in July at the Battle of New York, ten miles from the Bronx. Once more, air supremacy proved the deciding factor as Patton's forces were battered from above and by Rommel's forces across the field. II Corps would limp into New Jersey at only 50% strength. Patton became infamous in Washington for his missives demanding the USAAF develop something capable of "covering his ass" because he was tired of "Goering's fairies whipping it while he was trying to win a war."

President Dewey and his commanders had problems beyond Patton's. The Kriegsmarine had become emboldened by Admiral King's stretching of the American Atlantic Fleet along the East Coast. Grand Admiral Raeder was determined to seize control of the East Coast in order to both prevent the resurgence of American naval might, which was inevitable unless their ports and shipyards were either captured or destroyed, and to steal Hitler's attention away from Goering's posturing over the Luftwaffe's importance in razing NYC and saving Rommel's drive from defeat.
Raeder massed a strike force and made for New Jersey. Included in this group was the Graf Zeppelin which had recently arrived. Raeder's intent was to cut off King's northern fleet and decimate it before moving south to Virginia where he intended to draw off more of the Atlantic Fleet. Hitting so close to the capital of the United States would not only shake American resolve, it would also shut Goering up. Likewise, with the Graf Zeppelin, Raeder hoped to show the effectiveness of carriers to the Fuhrer in the hopes of reopening the Flugzeugträger program. He would then withdraw back to German controlled waters for a blockade of New England.

The first phase of Raeder's plan went perfectly. July 8, 1943, outnumbered and caught off guard, American naval craft north of Cape May were completely decimated. Raeder made excellent use of the Graf Zeppelin's aircraft for reconaissance and attack as well as Uboats to confuse American forces. Two American destroyers were sunk before Raeder's battleships even came within range. The sole survivor of the initial attack, the USS New York, was sunk as she fled south. Massachussetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut were essentially cut off for Rommel's eventual invasion.

Shock traveled throughout Washington. No one had expected the Kriegsmarine to make a move south so soon. Admiral King immediately called all available ships north to guard the capital. He also had all available aircraft put on alert.

Raeder, realizing the threat of American coastal aircraft, sought to draw the Atlantic Fleet away from Virginia. He shelled Dover, DE July 14 in order to draw King's attention. American aircraft did little damage as the Kriegsmarine retreated to open waters shortly after the opening salvos. A few days later, Raeder shelled Georgetown, DE. Once more, American aircraft did little damage as the Kriegsmarine slipped away. These hit and run missions would continue for the next two weeks sending citizens in the region into hysterics, as Raeder intended. He knew public pressure would eventually force the United States to respond.

By the end of July, Admiral King had gathered enough of the Atlantic Fleet together to push northward under Rear Admiral Arthur L. Bristol. He was given orders by King to find and, if possible, destroy the Kriegsmarine's strike force in detail. Should such occur, Bristol was given permission to venture north to relieve Massachussetts and attempt to disrupt the German's North Atlantic supply line. Only one aircraft carrier, USS Ranger, accompanied the American naval support force.

A picket line of Uboats off the coast of Delaware noticed the support force heading north and shadowed them, relaying information when possible to Raeder.

August 5, 1943, Raeder decided it was time to meet the enemy. He launched his entire complement of 20 Fieseler Fi 167 torpedo bombers and 20 Junkers Ju 87 dive bombers escorted by 10 Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters to seek out and destroy the USS Ranger as well as other parts of the Atlantic Fleet. The USS Ranger took priority.

The Graf Zeppelin's aircraft found the USS Ranger at 0714 hours. German aircraft caught the American force by surprise, hidden by the glare of the rising sun. A handful of American aircraft launched before the Kriegmarine's bombers arrived. Within half an hour the Ranger was a smoking wreck, taking on water, her flight deck pitted and useless. The German aircraft would also score hits on several other ships before returning to the Graf Zeppelin to rearm. They had suffered 2 Fi 167 dive bombers as casualties. All American naval aircraft were lost. The sky was Raeder's and he approached the support force for the kill.

What followed was the equivalent of a slugging match between the two forces. Though both fleets were roughly comparable, Raeder's aircraft tilted the balance. After suffering the loss of two cruisers and a destroyer, the Atlantic Fleet was ordered to withdraw back to Virginia. Raeder pursued them, sinking the battleship USS Texas, until the threat of coastal aircraft forced him to retreat.

The Atlantic Fleet suffered a bloody nose and would not resume offensive operations. Raeder, meanwhile, received accolades from the Fuhrer who was more than willing to begin the building of new carriers after the demonstration raeder had provided. Hitler also acceded to Raeder's opinion that the naval arm of the Luftwaffe should come under Raeder's command, citing difficulties had during the Atlantic campaign of trying to communicate with Luftwaffe commanders on the mainland. Goering fumed but had to accept it.

SOURCE: Klum, Roolf Raeder: Father of the Kriegsmarine

Goering Joins the Invasion

Reich Marshal Goering struggled to remain relevant in the American campaign. When the Fuhrer had first declared war on the United States, the Reich Marshal hadn't realized the consequences of that action.

Naval power was essential for both supplies across the Atlantic and to ferry troops for the planned invasion. Grand Admiral Raeder received more and more of Hitler's attention as the campaign's planning progressed pushing Goering to the periphery; a place he was not used to. There was also animosity between the two men over the Graf Zeppelin. Raeder had managed to create a naval aviation arm; something Goering viewed as an invasion of his field. That this man might now garner Hitler's attention completely away from him was too much.

Goering was quick to offer his own opinions on the planned invasion. Yes, initial naval strength would play a part but the length of the supply line and its continued vulnerability to America's Atlantic Fleet made it seemingly untenable. The Reich Marshal offered a solution. Airfields could be built on Iceland and Greenland and, once Rommel's forces landed, more fields could be built or seized in Canada. These airfields could then be used as an additional supply line, a Luftwaffe artery which could carry men and materiel through the air much more safely and at a fraction of the time. These airfields could resupply Luftwaffe craft on their long trek while longer ranged aircraft was in the works. Goering stressed the positives of his ideas: faster build-up, less risk, and proven via Operation Wotan.

Hitler liked the idea of a second supply line, especially with the enthusiasm it generated in the Reich Marshal. The Fuhrer thus planned for the initial wave of invasion to be naval to be supported by, and possibly superseded by, the Luftwaffe's air supply.

Raeder and Goering eyed each other wearily.

SOURCE: Groening, Oskar The Reich Marshal