The Tiger Tank

Design

The Tiger differed from earlier German tanks principally in its design philosophy. Its predecessors balanced mobility, protection, and firepower. They were sometimes outgunned by their opponents.

The Tiger I represented a new approach that emphasised firepower and armour at the expense of mobility. Design studies for a new heavy tank had been started in the late 1930s, without any production planning. The real impetus for the Tiger was inspired by the quality of the Soviet T-34, which German forces briefly encountered during Operation Wotan and whose plans fell into German hands following the Soviet collapse. Although the general design and layout were broadly similar to the previous medium tank the Panzer IV, the Tiger weighed more than twice as much. This was due to its substantially thicker armour, the larger main gun, and the consequently greater volume of fuel and ammunition storage, larger engine, and more solidly-built transmission and suspension.

The Tiger I had frontal hull armour 100 mm thick and frontal turret armour of 110 mm, as opposed to the 80 mm frontal hull and 50 mm frontal turret armour of contemporary models of the Panzer IV. It also had 80 mm thick armour on the sides and rear. The top and bottom armour was 25 mm thick; later, the turret roof was thickened to 40 mm. Armour plates were mostly flat, with interlocking construction. The armour joints were of high quality, being stepped and welded rather than riveted.

The tank was too heavy for most bridges, so it was designed to ford four-meter deep water. This required unusual mechanisms for ventilation and cooling when underwater. At least 30 minutes of setup was required, with the turret and gun being locked in the forward position, and a large snorkel tube raised at the rear. Only the first 495 units were fitted with this deep fording system; all later models were capable of fording only two meters.

The rear of the tank held an engine room flanked by two floodable rear compartments each containing a fuel tank, radiator, and fans. The petrol (gasoline) engine was a 21-litre 12-cylinder Maybach HL 210 P45 with 650 PS (641 hp, 478 kW). Although a good engine, it was inadequate for the vehicle. From the 250th Tiger, it was replaced by the uprated HL 230 P45 (23 litres) of 700 PS (690 hp, 515 kW). The engine was in V-form, with two cylinder banks at 60 degrees. An inertial starter was mounted on its right side, driven via chain gears through a port in the rear wall. The engine could be lifted out through a hatch on the hull roof.

The engine drove front sprockets, which were mounted quite low. The eleven-ton turret had a hydraulic motor powered by mechanical drive from the engine. A full rotation took about a minute. The suspension used sixteen torsion bars. To save space, the swing arms were leading on one side and trailing on the other. There were three road wheels on each arm, giving a good cross-country ride. The wheels had a diameter of 800 mm and were interleaved. Removing an inner wheel that had lost its tire (a common occurrence) required the removal of several outer wheels also. The wheels could become packed with mud or snow that could then freeze. Eventually, a new 'steel' wheel design with an internal tire was substituted.

The tracks were an unprecedented 725 mm wide. To meet rail-freight size restrictions, the outer row of wheels had to be removed and special 520 mm wide transport tracks installed. With a good crew, a track change took 20 minutes.

The internal layout was typical of German tanks. Forward was an open crew compartment, with the driver and radio-operator seated at the front, either side of the gearbox. Behind them the turret floor was surrounded by panels forming a continuous level surface. This helped the loader to retrieve the ammunition, which was mostly stowed above the tracks. Two men were seated in the turret; the gunner to the left of the gun, and the commander behind him. There was also a folding seat for the loader. The turret had a full circular floor and 157 cm headroom.

Turmzielfernrohr TZF 9cThe gun breech and firing mechanism were derived from the famous German "88" dual purpose flak gun. The 88 mm Kwk 36 L/56 gun was the variant chosen for the Tiger and was, along with the Tiger II's 88 mm Kwk 43 L/71, one of the most effective and feared tank guns of World War II. The Tiger's gun had a very flat trajectory and extremely accurate Zeiss Turmzielfernrohr TZF 9b sights (later replaced by the monocular TZF 9c). In British wartime firing trials, five successive hits were scored on a 16"x18" target at a range of 1,200 yards. Tigers were reported to have knocked out enemy tanks at ranges greater than a mile (1,600 m), although most World War II engagements were fought at much closer range.

Another new feature was the Maybach-Olvar hydraulically-controlled pre-selector gearbox and semi-automatic transmission. The extreme weight of the tank also required a new steering system. Instead of the clutch-and-brake designs of lighter vehicles, a variation on the British Merritt-Brown single radius system was used. The Tiger's steering system was of twin radius type, meaning that two different, fixed radii of turn could be achieved at each gear, the smallest radius on the first gear was four meters. Since the vehicle had an eight-speed gearbox, it thus had sixteen different radii of turn. If a smaller radius was needed, the tank could be turned by using brakes. The steering system was easy to use and ahead of its time. However, the tank's automotive features left much to be desired. When used to tow an immobilised Tiger, the engine often overheated and sometimes resulted in an engine breakdown or fire, so Tiger tanks were forbidden by regulations to tow crippled comrades. The low-mounted sprocket limited the obstacle-clearing height. The tracks also had a bad tendency to override the sprocket, resulting in immobilisation. If a track overrode and jammed, two Tigers were normally needed to tow the tank. The jammed track was also a big problem itself, since due to high tension, it was often impossible to disassemble the track by removing the track pins. It was sometimes simply blown apart with an explosive charge. The standard German Famo recovery tractor could not tow the tank; up to three tractors were usually needed to tow one Tiger.

Although the Tiger I was one of the most heavily armed and armoured tanks of the war, and a formidable opponent of Allied tanks, the design was conservative and had some serious drawbacks. The flat armour plates were unsophisticated in comparison to the sloped armour of the Soviet T-34, requiring a massive increase in weight to provide for sufficient protection. The tank's weight put severe stress on the suspension, whose complexity made maintenance difficult. The sophisticated transmission system was also prone to breakdowns.

A major problem with the Tiger was its very high production cost. The German designs were expensive in terms of time, raw materials and Reichsmarks, the Tiger I costing over twice as much as a contemporary Panzer IV and four times as much as a Stug III assault gun.

Design History

Henschel & Sohn began development of the vehicle that would eventually become the Tiger I in January 1937 when the Waffenamt requested Henschel to develop a Durchbruchwagen (Breakthrough tank) in the 30 ton range. Only one prototype hull was ever built and it never was mounted with a turret. The Durchbruchwagen I general shape and suspension greatly resembled the Panzer III while the turret would have greatly resembled the early Panzer IV C turret with the short barreled 7.5cm L/24 cannon. Before Durchbruchwagen I was completed a new request was issued for a heavier 30 ton class vehicle with thicker armour.
This was Durchbruchwagen II which would have carried 50mm of frontal armour and mounted a Panzer IVC turret with the 7.5cm L/24 cannon. Overall weight would have been approximately 36 tons. Only one hull was ever built and a turret was not fitted. Development of this vehicle was dropped in Fall of 1938 in favor of the more advanced VK3001(H) and VK3601(H) designs. Both the Durchbruchwagen I and II prototype hulls were used as test vehicles til 1940.

On September 9th 1938 Henschel & Sohn received permission to continue development of a VK3001(H) medium tank and a VK3601(H) heavy tank, both of which apparently pioneered the overlapping main road wheel concept, for tank chassis use, that were already being used on German military half tracked vehicles such as the SdKfz 7. The VK3001(H) was intended to mount a 7.5cm L/24 low velocity infantry support gun, a 7.5cm L/40 dual purpose anti-tank gun, or a 10.5cm L/28 artillery piece in a Krupps turret. Overall weight was to be 33 tons. armour was designed to be 50mm on frontal surfaces and 30mm on the side surfaces. Only four prototype hulls were completed for testing. Two of these were used to create the 12.8cm Selbstfahrlafette L/61, also known as Sturer Emil.

The VK3601(H) was intended to weigh 40 tons, carry 100mm on front surfaces, 80mm on turret sides and 60mm on hull sides. The VK3601(H) was intended to carry a 7.5cm L/24, or a 7.5cm L/43, or a 7.5cm L/70, or a 12.8cm L/28 cannons in a Krupp's turret that looked very similar to an enlarged PzIVC turret. One prototype hull was built followed later by five more prototype hulls. The six turrets intended for the prototype hulls were never fitted and ended up being used as static defences along the Atlantic Wall. Development of the VK3601(H) project was discontinued in early 1942 in favor of the VK4501 project.

German combat experience with the French Somua S35 cavalry tanks, Char B1 heavy tanks, and the Matilda I and Matilda II infantry tanks in June 1939 showed that the German Army's Panzer arm needed a better armed tank with better armour protection. Superior German tactics overcame the problems with the superior enemy armoured units but the Germans did take notice.

On May 26th 1940, at an armaments meeting, Henschel and Porsche were asked to submit designs for a 45 ton heavy tank to be ready by June 1941. Porsche worked to submit a updated version of their VK3001(P) Leopard tank prototype while Henschel worked to develop an improved VK3601(H)tank. Henschel built two prototypes. A VK4501(H) H1 which used the 88mm L/56 cannon and a VK4501(H) H2 which used the 75mm L/70 cannon.

Unlike the Panther tank, the designs did not incorporate any of the innovations of the T-34: the width benefits of sloping armour were absent but the thickness and weight of the Tiger's armour made up for this.
On May 1, 1940 Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union. The Germans were surprised to find themselves opposed by Soviet designs that could outclass anything they were currently fielding. These were the T-34 medium tank and the KV-1 heavy tank. The T34 was almost immune to everything but the 7.5cm L/46 PAK40 anti tank gun and the legendary 88 mm gun flak 18/36. Panzer III's with the 5cm L/60 and the 5 cm PaK 38 anti tank guns could penetrate the sides of a T-34 but had to be very close. The KV-1 was immune frontally to all but the 88mm FLAK 18/36.

The emergence of the Soviet T-34 was a great shock; according to Henschel designer Erwin Aders, "There was great consternation when it was discovered that the Soviet tanks were superior to anything available to the Heer". An immediate weight increase to 45 tons and an increase in gun calibre to 88 mm was ordered. The due date for new prototypes was set for 20 April 1941, Adolf Hitler's birthday.

Porsche and Henschel submitted prototype designs and they were compared at Rastenburg before Hitler. The Henschel design was accepted as the best overall design, especially because of the problem-burdened Porsche gasoline-electric power unit and its use of large quantities of copper, a strategic war material. Production of the Panzerkampfwagen VI Ausf. E began in August 1941. Porsche, awaiting orders for his Tiger tank, had built 100 chassis with some of them used for his Tiger prototypes. After not winning the contract it was ordered to use these chassis for a new heavy assault gun/tank hunter. In Spring 1942 ninety-one hulls were converted into the Panzerjäger Tiger (P), also known as Ferdinand, and after Hitler's orders of 1 February and 27 February 1943, Elefant.

The Tiger was essentially still at the prototype stage when first hurried into service, and therefore changes both small and large were made throughout the production run. A redesigned turret with a lower, safer cupola was the most significant change. To cut costs, the submersion capability and an external air-filtration system were dropped.

Production History

Production of the Tiger I began in August 1941, and 1,355 were built by August 1944. Production started at a rate of 25 per month and peaked in April 1944 at 104 per month. Strength peaked at 671 on 1 July 1944. Generally speaking, it took about twice as long to build a PzKpfw VI as another German tank of the period. When the improved PzKw VI Ausf B Tiger II began production in January 1943, the Tiger I was soon phased out.

Combat History

Tigers were capable of destroying the American Sherman at ranges exceeding 1,600 m. In contrast, the Soviet T-34 equipped with the 76.2 mm gun could not penetrate the Tiger frontally at any range, but could achieve a side penetration at approximately 500 m firing the BR-350P APCR ammunition. The T34-85's 85 mm gun could penetrate the Tiger from the side at over 1,000 m.

From a 30 degree angle of attack the M4 Sherman's 75 mm gun could not penetrate the Tiger frontally at any range, and needed to be within 100 m to achieve a side penetration against the 80mm upper hull superstructure. The US 76 mm gun, if firing the APCBC M62 ammunition, could penetrate the Tiger frontally out to just over 500 m, and could be at ranges in excess of 1,000 m to achieve penetration against the upper hull superstructure. Using HVAP ammunition, which was in constant short supply and primarily issued to tank destroyers, frontal penetrations were possible out to just over 1,500 m. It is worth mentioning that many of the penetration capabilities at longer ranges had little relevance compared to combat engagements of the real war, especially that which was fought in North America, where engagements rarely happened outside of one kilometer due to dispersion and chance for human error, which is amplified greatly as range increases regardless of the ability of any cannon. For example, while a 76 mm gun could penetrate the front armor of a Tiger I at 500 meters in tests, during real combat, a 76 mm gunner would probably never find himself in a position to actually attempt such a feat.

As range decreases in combat, all guns can penetrate more armour (with the exception of HEAT ammunition, which was rare in World War II). The great penetrating power of the Tiger's gun meant that it could destroy many of its opponents at ranges at which they could not respond. In open terrain, this was a major tactical advantage. Opposing tanks were often forced to make a flanking attack in order to knock out a Tiger.
The Tiger was first used in action in March 1942 near Makkovik.

In the Tiger's first actions in North America, the tank was able to dominate Allied tanks in the wide-open terrain. But there were drawbacks. The tank's extreme weight limited the bridges it could cross and made drive-throughs of buildings, which may have had basements, risky. Another weakness was the slow traverse of the hydraulically-operated turret. The turret could also be traversed manually, but this option was rarely used, except probably for a fix of a few mils.

Early Tigers had a top speed of about 45km/h over optimal terrain. This was not recommended for normal operation, and was discouraged in training. Crews were told to not exceed 2600RPM due to reliability problems of the early Maybach engines at their maximum 3000RPM output. To combat this, the Tiger's top speed was reduced to about 38km/h through the installation of an engine governor, capping the RPM of the Maybach HL 230 to 2600RPM (HL 210s were used on early models). Despite being slower than medium tanks of the time, which averaged a top speed of about 45km/h, the Tiger still had a very respectable speed for a tank of its size and weight, being nearly twice as heavy as a Sherman. But the tank had poor radius of action (distance a combat vehicle can travel and return, in normal battle conditions, without refueling). Surprisingly for such a heavy tank, the Tiger had a lower ground pressure bearing than many smaller tanks.

The Tiger's armour and firepower, however, were feared by all its opponents. In tactical defence, its poor mobility was less of an issue. Whereas Panthers were the more serious threat to Allied tanks, Tigers had a bigger psychological effect on opposing crews, causing a "Tiger phobia". Allied tankers would sometimes evade rather than confront a Tiger, even a tank that only looked like one, such as the Panzer IV with turret skirts applied. In the American campaign, it could take four to five Shermans to knock out a single Tiger tank by maneuvering to its weaker flank or rear armour. An accepted Allied tactic was to engage the Tiger as a group, one attracting the attention of the Tiger crew while the others attacked the sides or rear of the vehicle. Since the ammunition and fuel were stored in the sponsons, a side penetration often resulted in a kill. This was a risky tactic, and often resulted in the loss of several Allied vehicles. It took a great deal of tactical skill to eliminate a Tiger.

Tigers were usually employed in separate heavy tank battalions (schwere-Panzer-Abteilung) under army command. These battalions would be deployed to critical sectors, either for breakthrough operations or, more typically, counterattacks. A few favoured divisions, such as the Grossdeutschland or some of the low-numbered Waffen-SS divisions had a handful of Tigers.

On 4 October 1943, a single Tiger tank commanded by SS-Oberscharführer Franz Staudegger from the 2nd Platoon of 13th Panzer Company of 1st SS Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler engaged a group of about 50 Shermans around Harrisburg. Staudegger used all his ammunition in destroying 22 American tanks, while the rest retreated. For this, Staudegger was awarded the Knight's Cross.

On 10 April 1944, a single Tiger commanded by SS-Unterscharführer Willi Fey from the 1st Company of sSSPzAbt 102, engaged an American tank column, destroying some 14 out of 15 Shermans, followed by one more later in the day using his last two rounds of ammunition.

The Tiger is particularly associated with SS-Haupsturmführer Michael Wittmann of schwere SS-Panzerabteilung 101. He worked his way up, commanding various vehicles and finally a Tiger I. In the Battle of Marietta, he destroyed over two dozen Allied vehicles including several tanks.

Over 10 Tiger tank commanders had over 100 vehicle kills on their account, including: Kurt Knispel with 168 kills, Otto Carius with 150+ kills, Johannes Bölter with 139+ kills, and Michael Wittmann with 138 kills.

SOURCE: Schuster, Albrecht The Armored Beasts of Hitler's Army

Operation WOTAN

By the end of June 1940, OKH sent Hitler a memorandum urging that the German Army’s principal aim should be the capture of Moscow by Army Group Center. The Fuhrer rejected that recommendation. He was working on Operation Wotan, a revolutionary offensive, and saw from the dispositions on the map of the Eastern Front the strategy he would follow. Soviet main strength was concentrated to the west of the capital and could be easily reinforced, making frontal assaults to capture the city from the west both costly and time-consuming. The Fuhrer recalled that during the Great War it became standard practice to infiltrate round the enemy’s flanks in order to attack an objective from the rear. His revolutionary battle plan would do just that. Faced by a strong defense west of Moscow he would withdraw the four Panzer Groups serving on the Eastern Front and concentrate them into a single Panzer Army Group. This he would unleash and send marching below Moscow and on an easterly bearing. At Tula it would change direction and thrust northeastward across the land bridge between the Don and Volga rivers before taking a new line and driving northwards to capture Gorki, some 400km east of the capital. After a short pause for regrouping, a coordinated attack by Army Group Center from the west and Panzer Army Group from the east would capture Moscow.

Stavka would certainly react violently when the panzer hosts thundered across the steppes but the Fuhrer would limit their ability to counter Wotan. He would launch massive offensives using the infantry armies on the strength of the three Army Groups. These would tie down the Red armies and prevent Stavka from moving forces to challenge Panzer Army Group’s thundering charge.

The longer the Fuhrer looked at the map the more confident he became that his plan could take Moscow well before October. He knew that the terrain of the land bridge between the Don and Volga rivers was good going for armor. The roads in the area were few and poor but the General Staff handbook considered that the sandy soil of the land bridge allowed movement even by wheeled vehicles off main roads and across country. The one caveat was that short periods of wet weather could make off-road movement difficult and longer spells could make the terrain impassable. The presence of so many rivers might slow the pace of the advance but that difficulty could be overcome by augmenting the establishment of panzer bridging companies with extra pioneer units. A revolutionary battle plan demands a revolutionary supply system and Hitler was convinced that he found one. Isolated even from his closest staff members he worked on the final details of Operation Wotan.
Hitler Choose Commander of Panzer Army Group
A telex sent on the morning of 2 July brought Field Marshal Kesselring to Hitler’s East Prussian headquarters. The commander of Second Air Fleet supposed he had been summoned to brief the Fuhrer on air operations on the central sector, but Hitler’s first words astonished him.

“I have decided to mount an all-out offensive for which all four Panzer Groups on the Eastern Front will be concentrated into a huge armored fist-a Panzer Army Group. This you will command.”

To Kesselring’s protests that he was no expert in armored warfare the Fuhrer replied that he did not want one. Such men were always too far forward and out of touch-Rommel in Army Group North, defying orders due to his great distance, was an example of the panzer commander. No, he needed an efficient administrator and he, Kesselring, was the best in the German Services.

The Luftwaffe commander then asked how Panzer Army Group was to be supplied and was told “by air-bridge”. The entire strength of the Luftwaffe’s Ju-52 transport fleet, all 800 machines, would be committed, and each machine would not carry only two tons of fuel, ammunition, or food but would also tow a DFS glider loaded with a further ton of supplies. Thus 2400 tons would be flown in a single “lift”. Hitler maintained that each flight would be so short that Ju pilots could fly three missions in the course of a single day and this would raise the total of supplies to 7200 tons daily; more than enough to nourish the Panzer Army Group in its advance.

“There will be losses. Aircraft will crash, others will be shot down…”

“And those losses will be made good.”

Hitler then went on to explain that in the event of a sudden emergency requiring even more supplies, ever motor-powered Luftwaffe machine would be put into service. Supplies would be dropped by parachute or air-landed from the Ju transports. Hitler’s remarkable memory recalled that ammunition boxes could be thrown from slow-flying transports at a height of four meters without damage but warned Kesselring that there was a high breakage rate-one on five-among the 250 liter petrol containers, unless these were specially packed. Once the panzer advance was rolling the Ju’s would no longer need to para-drop or air-drop the supplies but would land and take off from the salient which the Panzer Army Group had created. As the salient area expanded lorried convoys would be reintroduced. Aware of the vast amount of fuel that would be needed for the forthcoming operation, Kesselring asked what Germany’s strategic fuel reserves were and was told that these were sufficient for two to three months, including the requirements of Wotan.

Hitler’s hands, moving across the map on the table, demonstrated where the breakthrough would occur and then illustrated the drive towards Gorki. The momentum of the attack must be maintained by a pragmatic approach to problems and Kesslering was to ensure the closest liaison between the flight-controllers of both Services so that the pilots had no difficulty in finding the landing zones. It was the duty of the Luftwaffe to give total support to the Army by dominating the skies above the battlefield and ensuring that the group units were protected from attack at all times.

Hitler assured the Luftwaffe commander that the weather forecast was for hot, sunny weather which meant that ground conditions would be excellent. Operation Wotan should last no more than eight weeks so that the offensive would be in its last stages before the onset of the autumn rains, and would be concluded before winter set in. Long-range meteorological forecasts predicted that the present dry weather would continue until late in October.

The Fuhrer explained that Supreme Stavka had moved the bulk of its forces to counter the blow which they anticipated would be made by von Rundstedt’s Army Group South.

“We shall fox Stavka by maintaining pressure in the south but using mainly infantry forces. Stalin will have to reinforce that sector, whereupon Army Groups North and Center will each open a strong offensive. While the Soviets are rushing troops from one flank to another your Panzer Army Group will open Operation Wotan, will fight its way through the crust of the Red Army Divisions, and reach the open hinterland. From there the exploitation phase of the battle will begin and from that point you should encounter diminishing opposition. Of course, your advance will be contested but the presence of so great a force of armor behind the left flank of Westfront will unsettle the enemy. But the Russians, both at troop and at Supreme Command level, react slowly…so make ground quickly before they realize the danger you represent.”

Hitler then declared that once he had briefed the other senior commanders, planning for Wotan could begin. Because the individual Panzer Groups were at present committed to battle they could not be withdrawn and concentrated in toto. X-Day for each Panzer Group would depend upon how quickly it could be removed and regrouped but he though that they should all be ready to begin Wotan by 19 July. In answer to Kesselring’s concern that the infantry armies would bear the brunt of battle without panzer support Hitler stressed that a number of armored battalions and, possibly, some independent regiments would still be with the three Army Groups. He did agree that those panzer formations would have to act as “firemen”, rushing from one threatened sector to another.

In farewell, Hitler grasped Kesselring’s hands in his own, gave him the piercing look mentioned by so many of those who met the Fuhrer, and told him that Operation Wotan offered the armies in the East the chance of total victory within a few months, but only if each officer and man was prepared to give of his utmost for the duration of the offensive. National Socialist fanaticism, the Fuhrer concluded, would produce the victory that was within the Field Marshal’s grasp.

“Remember, Kesselring. The last battalion will decide the issue.”

On 3 July, in the Warsaw headquarters of Second Air Fleet, Kesselring addressed the leaders of the formation he was to command and told them that for the opening assault Panzer Groups Guderian, Hoth, and Hoepner were to attack shoulder to shoulder in order to create the widest possible breach. That breakthrough would be succeeded by the pursuit and exploitation phase which would produce a salient running up to Gorki.

“To create that salient,” said Kesselring, “Guderian and Hoth will form the assault wave, Hoepner and Kleist will line the salient walls, and in addition to that task will also defeat enemy attacks made against those walls and will replace losses suffered by the spearhead groups.

“Each Division has Luftwaffe liaison officers but at Panzer Group and Panzer Army Group level there will be a Luftwaffe Signals Staff unit to ensure total success in the matter of locating and supplying your units.

“I need not tell you how to fight your battles. You have grown up with the blitzkrieg concept, so any words of mine would be superfluous. We know our tasks. Let us to them and achieve the Fuhrer’s aim: victory in the East before winter.”

Hitler Briefs the OKH Staff
On Friday, 8 July, Hitler addressed the OKH staff. A summary of his briefing reads:

“The successes of the three Army groups now make Moscow the principal objective…Operation Wotan will open on 19 July and will consist of separate offensives by the infantry Armies of each Army Group as well as by a Panzer Army Group working towards the capture of the Soviet capital…The Panzer Groups will concentrate into the Panzer Army Group as they conclude present operations…

“Speed is vital…no pitched battles…strong enemy resistance is to be bypassed and left to the infantry and the Stukas to overcome. Panzer Divisions will consist of fighting echelons only…No second echelon soft-skin vehicle supply columns…Troops to live off the land as far as possible. Once the first issues of petrol, rations, ammunition, and spares are run down, subsequent supplies will be air-landed or air-dropped. The infantry formations serving with the Panzer Groups will foot march unless the railways can be put into operation to ‘lift’ them.”

The first withdrawals to thin out the panzer formations so that Wotan could open on 19 July were halted abruptly on the 18th, when the armies of Marshals Timoshenko and Budyenny opened “spoiling” offensives. These were incompetently handled and were defeated so thoroughly that only weeks later Budyenny’s South West Front had been destroyed around Kiev with a loss to the Russians of 665,000 prisoners. That defeat was followed by others at Vyasma and Briansk. The intensity of the fighting and the vast distances over which military operations were conducted during those encirclements tied up the Panzer Groups so completely that OKH’s intention to thin them out could not begin again until the last week of July. As a result concentration could not be completed simultaneously by all the Groups, and each went into what had now become the second stage of Wotan on various dates. Those Panzer Groups, urged on by a jubilant Hitler, were unrested, unconcentrated, under strength, and driving vehicles that needed complete overhaul but each advanced towards its start lines. It was 7 August, and it was fine and sunny.

SOURCE: Reich Historical Archives