The Twin German Drives and an Atlantic Threat

Adolf Hitler flew to the Wermacht's Canadian HQ in March 1943 to meet with Field Marshal von Manstein to discuss the future of their American campaign. With American forces in disarray, Manstein was ordered by Hitler to split his forces for a drive west to capture Ottawa and a drive south towards New York City. Hitler believed that the fall of their capital would knock the Candians out of the war while the capture of NYC would serve a heavy blow to the American economy and cut off Massachussetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island which the Kriegsmarine could then effectively blockade. A subsequent use for Ottawa was for an eventual drive south past Toronto into Michigan aimed at Detroit. As to the future of the New York drive, Hitler intended to first mop up American forces in Massachussetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island and then push southwest toward Pittsburgh.

Manstein balked at splitting his forces when success was being achieved along the east coast. Manstein instead wanted to focus on a drive south aimed at Pittsburgh and then west into Ohio, Indiana, and finally Michigan. Hitler retorted that his plan was one giant pincer movement rather than a vulnerable scythe-like sweep. With success on the east coast and success in Michigan, the Wermacht could envelop Indiana and Ohio without a risk to its flanks. Also, Hitler's plan allowed for Detroit being captured early depriving America of one of its most important industrial and transportation hubs. It would also create a large pocket preventing a sizable number of American forces from escaping across the Mississippi River. Manstein would relent in the face of Hitler's adamant views. Rommel would be tasked with the drive south aimed at New York and then Pittsburgh. The drive west was given to Guderian. Manstein did this despite the protests of the General Staff. He realized the talents of Guderian and was not going to have them squandered by sycophants.

Loathed by the OKH for his independent streak and blunt language, Guderian had garned few allies in the upper echelons of German military authority. But the man got results and that was enough to keep his detractors at bay though promotion was another problem. Guderian realized the opportunity Manstein had given him and seized it with great enthusiasm. At the outset of his drive west, Guderian was surprised at the rapid progress he made. Canadian and American forces proved unable to counter his drive, their tanks poorly designed and their leadership amateurish. He would describe Allied battle techniques as blunt, savage, and simple using numbers to overwhelm and counter his forces when they could not outthink him. He also cited their lack of discipline, some units effectively crumbling at the thundering advance of his panzers. If not for supply problems, Guderian stated he could have taken Ottawa in two months. Instead, he would reach the Canadian capital by late August. PM King would declare it an open city. Following news of the Blitz in New York, King refused to have Ottawa's citizens suffer while the city was reduced to ruins. Hitler heaped great praise and awards on Guderian for his successful drive. The Fuhrer's lauding quickly turned to condemnation when PM King declared Canada would fight on.
Rommel's drive into the United States, meanwhile, intially met with the same success as Guderian. Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont fell within a month as Rommel and his Ghost Divisions stormed through New England. He entered New York via Granville on May 12. Meanwhile, there was a shake up of command in the American Army ranks.

Following the defeats of the U.S. II Corps by the Wermacht in the Canadian Campaign, General Dwight D. "Ike" Eisenhower wanted an assessment of the corps. After the losses of New Brunswick and the retreat into Maine, Eisenhower sent Major-General Omar Bradley to observe the conditions of the II Corps operationally.

On 16 April 1943, as a result of Bradley's report, Patton replaced Major-General Lloyd Fredendall as commander of the II Corps. Patton was also promoted to Lieutenant-General. Soon thereafter, Patton had Bradley reassigned to his Corps Command as deputy commander.

Tough in his training, Patton was generally unpopular with his troops. However, they preferred to serve with him because they thought he was their best chance to get home alive. US officers had noted the "softness" and lack of discipline in the II Corps under Fredendall. Patton required all personnel to wear steel helmets, even physicians in the operating wards, and required his troops to wear the unpopular lace-up leggings and neckties. A system of fines was introduced to ensure all personnel shaved daily and observed other uniform requirements. While these measures did not make Patton popular, they did tend to restore a sense of discipline and unit pride that may have been missing earlier. In a play on his nickname, troops joked that it was "his guts and our blood".

The discipline Patton required paid off quickly. Realizing Rommel's willingness to drive ahead brashly, Patton had his troops surrender ground in Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont to stretch Rommel's supply line, drawing him in and leaving him vulnerable on the flanks. By mid-May 1943, the counter-offensive of the U.S. II Corps began. At the Battle of Troy, Rommel was surprised by American forces. Patton pressed from the northwest threatening Rommel's flank using prototype bazookas to help him even the odds against German panzers, sowing confusion among the Wermacht's ranks. Only desperate action, personally led by himself, prevented Rommel from being cut off. The use of the 88s withering fire barely forced American armor back, sometimes at a distance of only fifty yards in what amounted to virtual hand to hand fighting. Patton sent wave after wave against the German line threatening a breakthrough at several points. Patton's success would be cut short. Luftwaffe forces were diverted from their assault on New York City to aid Rommel. With total air supremacy, the Luftwaffe straffed II Corps mercilessly sending the American drive into disarray. Patton would become legendary for standing up in his jeep at the approach of a Messerschmitt Bf 109 and pulling his pistol in a showdown. Soldiers watched in awe as the plane missed, Patton firing and cursing the pilot as he soared away.

Reluctantly, Patton withdrew to reorganize and plan. Rommel gained a great deal of respect for the general who blunted his drive and the American troops who proved their willingness and ability to fight. The German commander would not underestimate American military strength again.

Over the next two months, the generals would spar throughout New York until a decisive showdown in July at the Battle of New York, ten miles from the Bronx. Once more, air supremacy proved the deciding factor as Patton's forces were battered from above and by Rommel's forces across the field. II Corps would limp into New Jersey at only 50% strength. Patton became infamous in Washington for his missives demanding the USAAF develop something capable of "covering his ass" because he was tired of "Goering's fairies whipping it while he was trying to win a war."

President Dewey and his commanders had problems beyond Patton's. The Kriegsmarine had become emboldened by Admiral King's stretching of the American Atlantic Fleet along the East Coast. Grand Admiral Raeder was determined to seize control of the East Coast in order to both prevent the resurgence of American naval might, which was inevitable unless their ports and shipyards were either captured or destroyed, and to steal Hitler's attention away from Goering's posturing over the Luftwaffe's importance in razing NYC and saving Rommel's drive from defeat.
Raeder massed a strike force and made for New Jersey. Included in this group was the Graf Zeppelin which had recently arrived. Raeder's intent was to cut off King's northern fleet and decimate it before moving south to Virginia where he intended to draw off more of the Atlantic Fleet. Hitting so close to the capital of the United States would not only shake American resolve, it would also shut Goering up. Likewise, with the Graf Zeppelin, Raeder hoped to show the effectiveness of carriers to the Fuhrer in the hopes of reopening the Flugzeugträger program. He would then withdraw back to German controlled waters for a blockade of New England.

The first phase of Raeder's plan went perfectly. July 8, 1943, outnumbered and caught off guard, American naval craft north of Cape May were completely decimated. Raeder made excellent use of the Graf Zeppelin's aircraft for reconaissance and attack as well as Uboats to confuse American forces. Two American destroyers were sunk before Raeder's battleships even came within range. The sole survivor of the initial attack, the USS New York, was sunk as she fled south. Massachussetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut were essentially cut off for Rommel's eventual invasion.

Shock traveled throughout Washington. No one had expected the Kriegsmarine to make a move south so soon. Admiral King immediately called all available ships north to guard the capital. He also had all available aircraft put on alert.

Raeder, realizing the threat of American coastal aircraft, sought to draw the Atlantic Fleet away from Virginia. He shelled Dover, DE July 14 in order to draw King's attention. American aircraft did little damage as the Kriegsmarine retreated to open waters shortly after the opening salvos. A few days later, Raeder shelled Georgetown, DE. Once more, American aircraft did little damage as the Kriegsmarine slipped away. These hit and run missions would continue for the next two weeks sending citizens in the region into hysterics, as Raeder intended. He knew public pressure would eventually force the United States to respond.

By the end of July, Admiral King had gathered enough of the Atlantic Fleet together to push northward under Rear Admiral Arthur L. Bristol. He was given orders by King to find and, if possible, destroy the Kriegsmarine's strike force in detail. Should such occur, Bristol was given permission to venture north to relieve Massachussetts and attempt to disrupt the German's North Atlantic supply line. Only one aircraft carrier, USS Ranger, accompanied the American naval support force.

A picket line of Uboats off the coast of Delaware noticed the support force heading north and shadowed them, relaying information when possible to Raeder.

August 5, 1943, Raeder decided it was time to meet the enemy. He launched his entire complement of 20 Fieseler Fi 167 torpedo bombers and 20 Junkers Ju 87 dive bombers escorted by 10 Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters to seek out and destroy the USS Ranger as well as other parts of the Atlantic Fleet. The USS Ranger took priority.

The Graf Zeppelin's aircraft found the USS Ranger at 0714 hours. German aircraft caught the American force by surprise, hidden by the glare of the rising sun. A handful of American aircraft launched before the Kriegmarine's bombers arrived. Within half an hour the Ranger was a smoking wreck, taking on water, her flight deck pitted and useless. The German aircraft would also score hits on several other ships before returning to the Graf Zeppelin to rearm. They had suffered 2 Fi 167 dive bombers as casualties. All American naval aircraft were lost. The sky was Raeder's and he approached the support force for the kill.

What followed was the equivalent of a slugging match between the two forces. Though both fleets were roughly comparable, Raeder's aircraft tilted the balance. After suffering the loss of two cruisers and a destroyer, the Atlantic Fleet was ordered to withdraw back to Virginia. Raeder pursued them, sinking the battleship USS Texas, until the threat of coastal aircraft forced him to retreat.

The Atlantic Fleet suffered a bloody nose and would not resume offensive operations. Raeder, meanwhile, received accolades from the Fuhrer who was more than willing to begin the building of new carriers after the demonstration raeder had provided. Hitler also acceded to Raeder's opinion that the naval arm of the Luftwaffe should come under Raeder's command, citing difficulties had during the Atlantic campaign of trying to communicate with Luftwaffe commanders on the mainland. Goering fumed but had to accept it.

SOURCE: Klum, Roolf Raeder: Father of the Kriegsmarine

The Wermacht Land

German forces under Field Marshal von Manstein, led by General Rommel, were surprised by the initial lack of opposition following their amphibious landing in Labrador at Makkovik, March 1942. This was not entirely unexpected as American planning did not foresee the possibility of invasion until at least October whereas Hitler had pressed German forces across the Atlantic before they were truly ready as a token means of action in a radical plan. Rommel would later admit that his numbers were so small and poorly armed that even token Canadian military resistance would have sent them swimming back to their ships.

Once their beachhead was secure and their numbers reached adequate size, German forces drove southwest to Goose Bay, where a Luftwaffe base was rapidly constructed. Manstein intended for air support to protect Rommel's troops on their continuing drive southwest to Sept-Iles as well as to protect the vulnerable supply line which stretched across the Atlantic to Greenland and beyond and to serve as a point of air transport easing the reliance on naval craft to ferry men across the Atlantic. It was a bold idea which began to pay big dividends.

American naval forces did not move to threaten Germany's supply line until after Rommel's successful landing at Makkovik. Up until March, the Atlantic Fleet had focused on defensive maneuvers, sailing up and down the east coast. This was part of the reason for the ease of German landings. Another was flawed planning. The majority of the US Atlantic Fleet had believed the Germans would strike further south, New England being the prime candidate with its industrial base and economic importance. Northern Canada was viewed as inhospitable, difficult to navigate, and overall unfitting for a campaign and thus had never been viewed as a possible landing site. If Hitler were to strike, New Brunswick seemed the more intelligent choice with its roads, infrastructure, and proximity to high value targets. Problems of defense were further compounded by the lack of adequate ships to guard the east coast. Rearmament was only a year old and President Dewey had to protect both the Pacific and Atlantic. As such, American naval craft were thinly patrolling when Rommel's force arrived.

Angrily chastising the defensive policy he had been forced to follow, Admiral Ernest J. King turned to actively probing the Nazi Atlantic supply line with destroyers seeking to slow and eventually stop the flow of men and materiel. The initial probes by American destroyers of Germany's Atlantic supply line were the beginning stage of King's future naval plans.

President Dewey was briefed by Admiral King on Operation Viking which called for a sizable portion of the Atlantic Fleet to converge and engage the Kriegsmarine in the North Atlantic, defeat and scatter their ships, and, conditions permitting, send in an invasion force of Marines to seize Narsarsuaq on Greenland where they would then move along the coast to capture or kill all remaining German forces severing Manstein's main supply artery. Manstein's forces would wither and die in the snows of Northern Canada as American would use Greenland as a jump off point to push east to Iceland and then an eventual invasion of Europe.

This plan came into quick doubt following the American defeat at Midway. Parts of the Joint Chiefs asked if risking the remnants of American naval power was wise as the Pacific was now literally undefended. King's plan to assault the enemy sounded far too familiar to Admiral Nimitz's plans for a decisive battle with the Japs and they all knew how that turned out. Should the Atlantic Fleet fail, or worse, be decimated as the Pacific Fleet had been at Midway, what would protect America's eastern seaboard from invasion? With no one to stop him, Hitler could stab anywhere along America's vulnerable coast. The opposition also cited choppy waters, poor visibility, ice bergs, and a dug in enemy waiting for them as reasons to forgo Operation Viking and instead send ground forces to counter Manstein in Labrador while continuing to build up the navy for a future battle with the Kriegsmarine possibly by mid to late 1946. The Japs may have gotten lucky, they pointed out, but was America willing to gamble again with so much at stake?

The argument came to an abrupt end when Operation Viking was outright scuttled following U-48's encounter and sinking of USS Reuben James in a chance meeting in the early morning mists roughly 50 miles south of Qaanaaq. Dewey found the risks of exposing the Atlantic Fleet too great. Better they stay close to home where they could count on air coverage and ground support. King grumpily conceded and called the fleet back to the coast while the Joint Chiefs began to plot troop movements to meet Manstein's advance. This move horrified the Canadians and angered PM King who accused the United States of using his country as fodder to protect itself. Relations between the two countries would become strained.

Sept-Iles fell quickly to Rommel's audacious thrust May 25, but his forces stopped there. With Labrador occupied and the northern coast of the mouth of the Gulf of St. Lawrence in their hands, German forces prepared for yet another naval crossing. Their goal: The Gaspé Peninsula.

SOURCE: Engels, William Rommel and the Ghost Divisions

Operation WOTAN

By the end of June 1940, OKH sent Hitler a memorandum urging that the German Army’s principal aim should be the capture of Moscow by Army Group Center. The Fuhrer rejected that recommendation. He was working on Operation Wotan, a revolutionary offensive, and saw from the dispositions on the map of the Eastern Front the strategy he would follow. Soviet main strength was concentrated to the west of the capital and could be easily reinforced, making frontal assaults to capture the city from the west both costly and time-consuming. The Fuhrer recalled that during the Great War it became standard practice to infiltrate round the enemy’s flanks in order to attack an objective from the rear. His revolutionary battle plan would do just that. Faced by a strong defense west of Moscow he would withdraw the four Panzer Groups serving on the Eastern Front and concentrate them into a single Panzer Army Group. This he would unleash and send marching below Moscow and on an easterly bearing. At Tula it would change direction and thrust northeastward across the land bridge between the Don and Volga rivers before taking a new line and driving northwards to capture Gorki, some 400km east of the capital. After a short pause for regrouping, a coordinated attack by Army Group Center from the west and Panzer Army Group from the east would capture Moscow.

Stavka would certainly react violently when the panzer hosts thundered across the steppes but the Fuhrer would limit their ability to counter Wotan. He would launch massive offensives using the infantry armies on the strength of the three Army Groups. These would tie down the Red armies and prevent Stavka from moving forces to challenge Panzer Army Group’s thundering charge.

The longer the Fuhrer looked at the map the more confident he became that his plan could take Moscow well before October. He knew that the terrain of the land bridge between the Don and Volga rivers was good going for armor. The roads in the area were few and poor but the General Staff handbook considered that the sandy soil of the land bridge allowed movement even by wheeled vehicles off main roads and across country. The one caveat was that short periods of wet weather could make off-road movement difficult and longer spells could make the terrain impassable. The presence of so many rivers might slow the pace of the advance but that difficulty could be overcome by augmenting the establishment of panzer bridging companies with extra pioneer units. A revolutionary battle plan demands a revolutionary supply system and Hitler was convinced that he found one. Isolated even from his closest staff members he worked on the final details of Operation Wotan.
Hitler Choose Commander of Panzer Army Group
A telex sent on the morning of 2 July brought Field Marshal Kesselring to Hitler’s East Prussian headquarters. The commander of Second Air Fleet supposed he had been summoned to brief the Fuhrer on air operations on the central sector, but Hitler’s first words astonished him.

“I have decided to mount an all-out offensive for which all four Panzer Groups on the Eastern Front will be concentrated into a huge armored fist-a Panzer Army Group. This you will command.”

To Kesselring’s protests that he was no expert in armored warfare the Fuhrer replied that he did not want one. Such men were always too far forward and out of touch-Rommel in Army Group North, defying orders due to his great distance, was an example of the panzer commander. No, he needed an efficient administrator and he, Kesselring, was the best in the German Services.

The Luftwaffe commander then asked how Panzer Army Group was to be supplied and was told “by air-bridge”. The entire strength of the Luftwaffe’s Ju-52 transport fleet, all 800 machines, would be committed, and each machine would not carry only two tons of fuel, ammunition, or food but would also tow a DFS glider loaded with a further ton of supplies. Thus 2400 tons would be flown in a single “lift”. Hitler maintained that each flight would be so short that Ju pilots could fly three missions in the course of a single day and this would raise the total of supplies to 7200 tons daily; more than enough to nourish the Panzer Army Group in its advance.

“There will be losses. Aircraft will crash, others will be shot down…”

“And those losses will be made good.”

Hitler then went on to explain that in the event of a sudden emergency requiring even more supplies, ever motor-powered Luftwaffe machine would be put into service. Supplies would be dropped by parachute or air-landed from the Ju transports. Hitler’s remarkable memory recalled that ammunition boxes could be thrown from slow-flying transports at a height of four meters without damage but warned Kesselring that there was a high breakage rate-one on five-among the 250 liter petrol containers, unless these were specially packed. Once the panzer advance was rolling the Ju’s would no longer need to para-drop or air-drop the supplies but would land and take off from the salient which the Panzer Army Group had created. As the salient area expanded lorried convoys would be reintroduced. Aware of the vast amount of fuel that would be needed for the forthcoming operation, Kesselring asked what Germany’s strategic fuel reserves were and was told that these were sufficient for two to three months, including the requirements of Wotan.

Hitler’s hands, moving across the map on the table, demonstrated where the breakthrough would occur and then illustrated the drive towards Gorki. The momentum of the attack must be maintained by a pragmatic approach to problems and Kesslering was to ensure the closest liaison between the flight-controllers of both Services so that the pilots had no difficulty in finding the landing zones. It was the duty of the Luftwaffe to give total support to the Army by dominating the skies above the battlefield and ensuring that the group units were protected from attack at all times.

Hitler assured the Luftwaffe commander that the weather forecast was for hot, sunny weather which meant that ground conditions would be excellent. Operation Wotan should last no more than eight weeks so that the offensive would be in its last stages before the onset of the autumn rains, and would be concluded before winter set in. Long-range meteorological forecasts predicted that the present dry weather would continue until late in October.

The Fuhrer explained that Supreme Stavka had moved the bulk of its forces to counter the blow which they anticipated would be made by von Rundstedt’s Army Group South.

“We shall fox Stavka by maintaining pressure in the south but using mainly infantry forces. Stalin will have to reinforce that sector, whereupon Army Groups North and Center will each open a strong offensive. While the Soviets are rushing troops from one flank to another your Panzer Army Group will open Operation Wotan, will fight its way through the crust of the Red Army Divisions, and reach the open hinterland. From there the exploitation phase of the battle will begin and from that point you should encounter diminishing opposition. Of course, your advance will be contested but the presence of so great a force of armor behind the left flank of Westfront will unsettle the enemy. But the Russians, both at troop and at Supreme Command level, react slowly…so make ground quickly before they realize the danger you represent.”

Hitler then declared that once he had briefed the other senior commanders, planning for Wotan could begin. Because the individual Panzer Groups were at present committed to battle they could not be withdrawn and concentrated in toto. X-Day for each Panzer Group would depend upon how quickly it could be removed and regrouped but he though that they should all be ready to begin Wotan by 19 July. In answer to Kesselring’s concern that the infantry armies would bear the brunt of battle without panzer support Hitler stressed that a number of armored battalions and, possibly, some independent regiments would still be with the three Army Groups. He did agree that those panzer formations would have to act as “firemen”, rushing from one threatened sector to another.

In farewell, Hitler grasped Kesselring’s hands in his own, gave him the piercing look mentioned by so many of those who met the Fuhrer, and told him that Operation Wotan offered the armies in the East the chance of total victory within a few months, but only if each officer and man was prepared to give of his utmost for the duration of the offensive. National Socialist fanaticism, the Fuhrer concluded, would produce the victory that was within the Field Marshal’s grasp.

“Remember, Kesselring. The last battalion will decide the issue.”

On 3 July, in the Warsaw headquarters of Second Air Fleet, Kesselring addressed the leaders of the formation he was to command and told them that for the opening assault Panzer Groups Guderian, Hoth, and Hoepner were to attack shoulder to shoulder in order to create the widest possible breach. That breakthrough would be succeeded by the pursuit and exploitation phase which would produce a salient running up to Gorki.

“To create that salient,” said Kesselring, “Guderian and Hoth will form the assault wave, Hoepner and Kleist will line the salient walls, and in addition to that task will also defeat enemy attacks made against those walls and will replace losses suffered by the spearhead groups.

“Each Division has Luftwaffe liaison officers but at Panzer Group and Panzer Army Group level there will be a Luftwaffe Signals Staff unit to ensure total success in the matter of locating and supplying your units.

“I need not tell you how to fight your battles. You have grown up with the blitzkrieg concept, so any words of mine would be superfluous. We know our tasks. Let us to them and achieve the Fuhrer’s aim: victory in the East before winter.”

Hitler Briefs the OKH Staff
On Friday, 8 July, Hitler addressed the OKH staff. A summary of his briefing reads:

“The successes of the three Army groups now make Moscow the principal objective…Operation Wotan will open on 19 July and will consist of separate offensives by the infantry Armies of each Army Group as well as by a Panzer Army Group working towards the capture of the Soviet capital…The Panzer Groups will concentrate into the Panzer Army Group as they conclude present operations…

“Speed is vital…no pitched battles…strong enemy resistance is to be bypassed and left to the infantry and the Stukas to overcome. Panzer Divisions will consist of fighting echelons only…No second echelon soft-skin vehicle supply columns…Troops to live off the land as far as possible. Once the first issues of petrol, rations, ammunition, and spares are run down, subsequent supplies will be air-landed or air-dropped. The infantry formations serving with the Panzer Groups will foot march unless the railways can be put into operation to ‘lift’ them.”

The first withdrawals to thin out the panzer formations so that Wotan could open on 19 July were halted abruptly on the 18th, when the armies of Marshals Timoshenko and Budyenny opened “spoiling” offensives. These were incompetently handled and were defeated so thoroughly that only weeks later Budyenny’s South West Front had been destroyed around Kiev with a loss to the Russians of 665,000 prisoners. That defeat was followed by others at Vyasma and Briansk. The intensity of the fighting and the vast distances over which military operations were conducted during those encirclements tied up the Panzer Groups so completely that OKH’s intention to thin them out could not begin again until the last week of July. As a result concentration could not be completed simultaneously by all the Groups, and each went into what had now become the second stage of Wotan on various dates. Those Panzer Groups, urged on by a jubilant Hitler, were unrested, unconcentrated, under strength, and driving vehicles that needed complete overhaul but each advanced towards its start lines. It was 7 August, and it was fine and sunny.

SOURCE: Reich Historical Archives