The Wermacht Land

German forces under Field Marshal von Manstein, led by General Rommel, were surprised by the initial lack of opposition following their amphibious landing in Labrador at Makkovik, March 1942. This was not entirely unexpected as American planning did not foresee the possibility of invasion until at least October whereas Hitler had pressed German forces across the Atlantic before they were truly ready as a token means of action in a radical plan. Rommel would later admit that his numbers were so small and poorly armed that even token Canadian military resistance would have sent them swimming back to their ships.

Once their beachhead was secure and their numbers reached adequate size, German forces drove southwest to Goose Bay, where a Luftwaffe base was rapidly constructed. Manstein intended for air support to protect Rommel's troops on their continuing drive southwest to Sept-Iles as well as to protect the vulnerable supply line which stretched across the Atlantic to Greenland and beyond and to serve as a point of air transport easing the reliance on naval craft to ferry men across the Atlantic. It was a bold idea which began to pay big dividends.

American naval forces did not move to threaten Germany's supply line until after Rommel's successful landing at Makkovik. Up until March, the Atlantic Fleet had focused on defensive maneuvers, sailing up and down the east coast. This was part of the reason for the ease of German landings. Another was flawed planning. The majority of the US Atlantic Fleet had believed the Germans would strike further south, New England being the prime candidate with its industrial base and economic importance. Northern Canada was viewed as inhospitable, difficult to navigate, and overall unfitting for a campaign and thus had never been viewed as a possible landing site. If Hitler were to strike, New Brunswick seemed the more intelligent choice with its roads, infrastructure, and proximity to high value targets. Problems of defense were further compounded by the lack of adequate ships to guard the east coast. Rearmament was only a year old and President Dewey had to protect both the Pacific and Atlantic. As such, American naval craft were thinly patrolling when Rommel's force arrived.

Angrily chastising the defensive policy he had been forced to follow, Admiral Ernest J. King turned to actively probing the Nazi Atlantic supply line with destroyers seeking to slow and eventually stop the flow of men and materiel. The initial probes by American destroyers of Germany's Atlantic supply line were the beginning stage of King's future naval plans.

President Dewey was briefed by Admiral King on Operation Viking which called for a sizable portion of the Atlantic Fleet to converge and engage the Kriegsmarine in the North Atlantic, defeat and scatter their ships, and, conditions permitting, send in an invasion force of Marines to seize Narsarsuaq on Greenland where they would then move along the coast to capture or kill all remaining German forces severing Manstein's main supply artery. Manstein's forces would wither and die in the snows of Northern Canada as American would use Greenland as a jump off point to push east to Iceland and then an eventual invasion of Europe.

This plan came into quick doubt following the American defeat at Midway. Parts of the Joint Chiefs asked if risking the remnants of American naval power was wise as the Pacific was now literally undefended. King's plan to assault the enemy sounded far too familiar to Admiral Nimitz's plans for a decisive battle with the Japs and they all knew how that turned out. Should the Atlantic Fleet fail, or worse, be decimated as the Pacific Fleet had been at Midway, what would protect America's eastern seaboard from invasion? With no one to stop him, Hitler could stab anywhere along America's vulnerable coast. The opposition also cited choppy waters, poor visibility, ice bergs, and a dug in enemy waiting for them as reasons to forgo Operation Viking and instead send ground forces to counter Manstein in Labrador while continuing to build up the navy for a future battle with the Kriegsmarine possibly by mid to late 1946. The Japs may have gotten lucky, they pointed out, but was America willing to gamble again with so much at stake?

The argument came to an abrupt end when Operation Viking was outright scuttled following U-48's encounter and sinking of USS Reuben James in a chance meeting in the early morning mists roughly 50 miles south of Qaanaaq. Dewey found the risks of exposing the Atlantic Fleet too great. Better they stay close to home where they could count on air coverage and ground support. King grumpily conceded and called the fleet back to the coast while the Joint Chiefs began to plot troop movements to meet Manstein's advance. This move horrified the Canadians and angered PM King who accused the United States of using his country as fodder to protect itself. Relations between the two countries would become strained.

Sept-Iles fell quickly to Rommel's audacious thrust May 25, but his forces stopped there. With Labrador occupied and the northern coast of the mouth of the Gulf of St. Lawrence in their hands, German forces prepared for yet another naval crossing. Their goal: The Gaspé Peninsula.

SOURCE: Engels, William Rommel and the Ghost Divisions