Guderian's drive into Indiana was just as rapid, Elkhart falling April 13, followed by Ft. Wayne on April 19. The first signs of organized American forces appeared as he approached Muncie, April 25. The VI Corps, under Major General Ernest J. Dawley, had moved east from Illinois in late March, taking up position north of Indianapolis on April 17. When news came of Guderian's march south, Dawley prepared his forces to meet him. It was patrols of the 45th Division which first encountered Wermacht troops outside Muncie on April 25. Brief gunfire was exchanged before American forces withdrew to report German troop movements.German and American forces would skirmish over the next three days in and around Delaware County with Guderian forcing Dawley gradually southwestward. The fourth day of fighting transpired near the White River, five miles from Yorktown. The river to his rear, Dawley found himself trapped. With a lack of decent armor, only VI Corps' artillery served to deter German charges meant to drive them into the river. This was quickly solved by Guderian's panzers which sliced through the VI's infantry and overran Dawley's main guns. Suffering heavy casualties, many American soldiers dove into the White River swimming across to the southern shore while being shot at by Wermacht rifles and panzer cannons. Scores of bodies would foul the water for weeks to come, some washing up as far as ten miles downriver.
Rommel, meanwhile, had picked up his breathtaking pace reaching Marietta, OH on April 28. There he met parts of the reconstituted II Corps, now commanded by Major General Geoffrey Keyes.
Patton, the former commander of II Corps, had been "promoted" to an inactive front, commander of III Corps at the Presidio in Monterey, CA, due to his controversial dealings with his superiors and subordinates. The press had printed some of Patton's abusive correspondence with Washington greatly angering President Dewey who wouldn't bear his authority being undermined. Dewey was sure Patton had leaked the correspondence as a way to guilt him into action on a list of complaints the general had earlier sent him. To make matters worse was Patton's slapping of a soldier suffering from shell shock following the Battle of Pittsburgh. Patton's abrasive personality drove Eisenhower to move the man as far away as possible for his own good.
Major General Keyes proved an able leader though not as skilled as Rommel who rapidly punctured the American line and rolled up part of II Corps by April 30. Only Keyes deft maneuvering kept the entire II Corps from being enveloped. Part of the reason for this defeat was attributed to II Corps' armor which stood at 65%, manned largely with inexperienced tank crews that had been rushed to the front. Among these tanks was the M5 which saw its first frontline action, performing well under fire but still inadequate against German Panthers.
The Battle of Marietta would end American support for light tanks and lead to the development of medium and heavy tanks. Rommel would complete the annihilation of II Corps over the next four days leaving only 80,000 American troops between him and Washington to the east, but the German commander turned west to link up with Guderian as ordered despite a desire to gamble for the American capital.
In Indiana, Indianapolis was encircled by Guderian April 28 and taken two days later severing a vital transportation hub in a largely bloodless offensive. Guderian would then turn southeast cutting a swath through disorganized American forces, put together piecemeal from whatever was available, on his way to the Ohio border.
Rommel and Guderian would meet in Cincinnati on May 14. Though this served as a major blow to the United States, it was only the beginning of a larger offensive.
In Indiana, Indianapolis was encircled by Guderian April 28 and taken two days later severing a vital transportation hub in a largely bloodless offensive. Guderian would then turn southeast cutting a swath through disorganized American forces, put together piecemeal from whatever was available, on his way to the Ohio border.
Rommel and Guderian would meet in Cincinnati on May 14. Though this served as a major blow to the United States, it was only the beginning of a larger offensive.
Hitler had decided to open a second front in September 1943 following the beating Rommel had taken in Pennsylvania to relieve the pressure on German forces in New England and to put renewed pressure on the American capital. The Fuhrer looked towards a landing somewhere along the Carolina coast. Goering and Raeder would aid Hitler in his planning. What the pair offered up most were doubts.
Goering informed the Fuhrer that landings anywhere south of Virginia would be unsupported by Luftwaffe aircraft, the distance being too great from their airfields in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Raeder further warned Hitler that should the Carolina landings be successful, there was the possibility that the United States could blockade the coast using parts of the Atlantic and Pacific fleets cutting off the landing force from resupply. Up to this point, the United States had been willing to not call on the Pacific Fleet to augment their Atlantic naval forces, but the German offensive in the south could be viewed as a large enough threat to redeploy parts of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic, especially due to the lull that had settled over the west coast. Then there was the problem of landing and amphibious craft which were in short supply. There would need to be designs drawn up, raw materials allocated, workers found, etc. This didn't include the training necessary to prepare troops for the operation. The entire venture was not likely to happen in less than two years at best and even then it was still fraught with a myriad of threats of failure.
But Hitler would not be swayed. The very audacity of the plan, coupled with the fact that it would be the largest amphibious assault in history, mesmerized the German leader. When Raeder and Goering realized the futility of halting preparations, they tried to convince the Fuhrer to move the landing point further north to allow for air support. Hitler would not hear of it. First, the threat of American air forces would be minimal in the Carolinas. Naval reconnaissance had found only four to five squadrons scattered across the area, mostly used for training and coastal patrols. The Fuhrer was quick to point out to Raeder the fact that recent modifications to five merchant ships would provide the Kriegsmarine with additional escort carriers whose fighter complement added up to 30 Bf 109s. Added to the Graf Zeppelin's aircraft, that numbered 40 fighters placing the American to German fighter ratio at roughly around 2:1. German aircraft had proven its supremacy time and again and American air forces would be disorganized coming from several air fields and could, likely, be intercepted before they became a problem. Second, landing anywhere in Virginia was ridiculous with the American troop presence so close to Washington. The invasion force would quickly find itself bogged down by soldiers already on alert and then pushed back into the sea. An attack further south would face minimal opposition allowing for an easier push inland and would also serve to draw off forces opening Washington to the joint forces of Rommel and Guderian leading to the fall of the capital and the end of the United States as a coherent entity.
"American forces are broken," Hitler stated. "All it will take is one more bold stroke to shatter their resolve. Our forces will walk over them to everlasting victory!"
As to the problems of landing craft, Hitler ordered German forces to begin confiscating all merchant and commerical craft in the occupied areas of Canada and New England. They had until summer 1944. Speed and surprise was essential.
The initial phase of the operation, the combined Luftwaffe/Kriegsmarine assault on Newport News in November 1943, served to drive the Atlantic Fleet south. It would be followed by numerous sorties to keep the Atlantic Fleet away from the proposed landing zones and to allow for aerial reconnaissance of the region. With naval success on the American east coast, Hitler ordered plans for an amphibious landing at Charleston to be sped up. He would travel to Philadelphia to set up his American HQ to oversee the Atlantic Theater, coordinating with Rommel, Guderian, Manstein, Goering, and Raeder. Training for the landing was conducted throughout late winter/early spring.
The initial phase of the operation, the combined Luftwaffe/Kriegsmarine assault on Newport News in November 1943, served to drive the Atlantic Fleet south. It would be followed by numerous sorties to keep the Atlantic Fleet away from the proposed landing zones and to allow for aerial reconnaissance of the region. With naval success on the American east coast, Hitler ordered plans for an amphibious landing at Charleston to be sped up. He would travel to Philadelphia to set up his American HQ to oversee the Atlantic Theater, coordinating with Rommel, Guderian, Manstein, Goering, and Raeder. Training for the landing was conducted throughout late winter/early spring.
30 May 1944, Raeder initiated the invasion heading south from New Jersey. American forces would be ill-equipped to counter the coming attack, lacking in men and materiel. The American General Staff had become used to Raeder's roaming up and down the east coast over the past year in what was perceived as a useless blockade. Any threat the German Admiral offered, such as shelling of coastal ports, had been kept at bay by coastal aircraft which had markedly increased in northern Virginia. Also, after having overreacted to the joint Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine attack on Newport News, and with Rommel and Guderian to their west, American commanders were not willing to divert troops to the Carolina shores. In fact, they had diverted troops north to defend against a renewed drive by the Wermacht on Washington. The American Midwest and Washington took priority. Thus, South Carolina was not prepared for the German forces that stormed her shores, having been stripped of a vast amount of divisional strength and mostly used as a training area.
The Battle of Charleston began at 0300, June 6, with a naval barrage accompanied by bombing runs by the Graf Zeppelin's Ju-87s which would render the air strips at Myrtle Beach and Charleston Army Air Fields useless, grounding their squadrons and stripping air supremacy from American forces.
121,000 Wermacht troops ran ashore over the next five hours starting at 0630 in a motley collection of cruise ships, steamers, and other craft overwhelming limited American resistance in what quickly became a debacle for the American High Command. By the time USAAF air support could be called from nearby air fields in Florence and Charlotte, German troops had secured their beachheads and were driving inland. When USAAF forces arrived on the scene, what they found was mass panic. Numerous civilians clogged the roads trying to escape the German drive. What they did not know was that aircraft from the Graf Zeppelin and her escort carriers had been strafing and bombing American civilians in their exodus causing mass panic.The German invasion of Charleston was only part of the Operation.
Following the success of their spring campaign, Rommel and Guderian used the bulk of their forces to stab into West Virginia in a drive aimed at Washington itself meant to divert troops and attention away from South Carolina prior to the amphibious landings. This drive commenced in mid-May and reached as far as Moorefield, WV by June 6. Surprised by the ease of their eastward assault, Rommel and Guderian decided to press further than planned. The first line of defenses surrounding Washington would be shattered three days later.Washington was in a panic. They had no immediate forces to counter the invasion in South Carolina, Rommel was less than thirty miles away, and the threat of losing the entire east coast was fast becoming a reality. Many voiced the opinion that Washington should be abandoned so that American forces could then focus on crushing the German forces at Charleston while maintaining a coherent defense against German forces from the north. President Dewey refused to abandon the capital citing its symbolic nature. Instead, he ordered that all forces in Virginia be focused on defending the capital while the fleet was to solve the problem in Carolina. Parts of the Pacific Fleet would be diverted east in the weeks to come while the bulk of the Atlantic Fleet was told to move north and engage the Kriegsmarine.
Admiral King issued the command for the Atlantic Fleet to remove the Kriegsmarine from the Carolina coast that the Wermacht in Charleston could be cut off and captured by I Corps. The decisive battle of the Atlantic unfolded June 12 between the Atlantic Fleet and the Kriegsmarine. Raeder was ordered by Hitler himself to hold his position at all costs. Raeder's naval aviators held the sky against American aircraft. The majority of the USAAF pilots were still trainees and quickly overwhelmed by the German aces who tore them apart. The two navies pounded one another across the sea taking numerous casualties. While Ju 87s and Fi 167s rained fire from above, Uboats attacked from the depths. Le Malin class destroyers glided through the churning waters blasting holes in American naval craft with elegant efficiency. Fiery pyres littered the ocean blazing brightly along the horizon.
American naval forces fought on despite their losses, realizing that South Carolina was likely lost if they retreated. Their determination was heroic and shocking to the German sailors who witnessed it. One remarkable event was the ramming of an American cruiser into one of the German escort carriers. Despite their efforts, they were overcome by the Kriegsmarine. Raeder pressed in for the kill virtually decimating the remains of the Atlantic Fleet as it finally turned to retreat south. The Grand Admiral would send his Uboats after them as he took up position off the coast.
SOURCE: Wilder, George Hitler's Great Gamble: The Amphibious Invasion of Charleston
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