April 1944 - June 1944

Hitler's order to secure the industrial core of America recommenced in the spring of 1944 when Rommel drove into Ohio reaching Youngstown April 10. American forces, largely National Guard units, offered little resistance as he struck northwest towards Cleveland, taking the city on April 17, before then striking south for Akron.

Guderian's drive into Indiana was just as rapid, Elkhart falling April 13, followed by Ft. Wayne on April 19. The first signs of organized American forces appeared as he approached Muncie, April 25. The VI Corps, under Major General Ernest J. Dawley, had moved east from Illinois in late March, taking up position north of Indianapolis on April 17. When news came of Guderian's march south, Dawley prepared his forces to meet him. It was patrols of the 45th Division which first encountered Wermacht troops outside Muncie on April 25. Brief gunfire was exchanged before American forces withdrew to report German troop movements.

German and American forces would skirmish over the next three days in and around Delaware County with Guderian forcing Dawley gradually southwestward. The fourth day of fighting transpired near the White River, five miles from Yorktown. The river to his rear, Dawley found himself trapped. With a lack of decent armor, only VI Corps' artillery served to deter German charges meant to drive them into the river. This was quickly solved by Guderian's panzers which sliced through the VI's infantry and overran Dawley's main guns. Suffering heavy casualties, many American soldiers dove into the White River swimming across to the southern shore while being shot at by Wermacht rifles and panzer cannons. Scores of bodies would foul the water for weeks to come, some washing up as far as ten miles downriver.

Rommel, meanwhile, had picked up his breathtaking pace reaching Marietta, OH on April 28. There he met parts of the reconstituted II Corps, now commanded by Major General Geoffrey Keyes.

Patton, the former commander of II Corps, had been "promoted" to an inactive front, commander of III Corps at the Presidio in Monterey, CA, due to his controversial dealings with his superiors and subordinates. The press had printed some of Patton's abusive correspondence with Washington greatly angering President Dewey who wouldn't bear his authority being undermined. Dewey was sure Patton had leaked the correspondence as a way to guilt him into action on a list of complaints the general had earlier sent him. To make matters worse was Patton's slapping of a soldier suffering from shell shock following the Battle of Pittsburgh. Patton's abrasive personality drove Eisenhower to move the man as far away as possible for his own good.

Major General Keyes proved an able leader though not as skilled as Rommel who rapidly punctured the American line and rolled up part of II Corps by April 30. Only Keyes deft maneuvering kept the entire II Corps from being enveloped. Part of the reason for this defeat was attributed to II Corps' armor which stood at 65%, manned largely with inexperienced tank crews that had been rushed to the front. Among these tanks was the M5 which saw its first frontline action, performing well under fire but still inadequate against German Panthers.

The Battle of Marietta would end American support for light tanks and lead to the development of medium and heavy tanks. Rommel would complete the annihilation of II Corps over the next four days leaving only 80,000 American troops between him and Washington to the east, but the German commander turned west to link up with Guderian as ordered despite a desire to gamble for the American capital.

In Indiana, Indianapolis was encircled by Guderian April 28 and taken two days later severing a vital transportation hub in a largely bloodless offensive. Guderian would then turn southeast cutting a swath through disorganized American forces, put together piecemeal from whatever was available, on his way to the Ohio border.

Rommel and Guderian would meet in Cincinnati on May 14. Though this served as a major blow to the United States, it was only the beginning of a larger offensive.

Hitler had decided to open a second front in September 1943 following the beating Rommel had taken in Pennsylvania to relieve the pressure on German forces in New England and to put renewed pressure on the American capital. The Fuhrer looked towards a landing somewhere along the Carolina coast. Goering and Raeder would aid Hitler in his planning. What the pair offered up most were doubts.

Goering informed the Fuhrer that landings anywhere south of Virginia would be unsupported by Luftwaffe aircraft, the distance being too great from their airfields in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Raeder further warned Hitler that should the Carolina landings be successful, there was the possibility that the United States could blockade the coast using parts of the Atlantic and Pacific fleets cutting off the landing force from resupply. Up to this point, the United States had been willing to not call on the Pacific Fleet to augment their Atlantic naval forces, but the German offensive in the south could be viewed as a large enough threat to redeploy parts of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic, especially due to the lull that had settled over the west coast. Then there was the problem of landing and amphibious craft which were in short supply. There would need to be designs drawn up, raw materials allocated, workers found, etc. This didn't include the training necessary to prepare troops for the operation. The entire venture was not likely to happen in less than two years at best and even then it was still fraught with a myriad of threats of failure.

But Hitler would not be swayed. The very audacity of the plan, coupled with the fact that it would be the largest amphibious assault in history, mesmerized the German leader. When Raeder and Goering realized the futility of halting preparations, they tried to convince the Fuhrer to move the landing point further north to allow for air support. Hitler would not hear of it. First, the threat of American air forces would be minimal in the Carolinas. Naval reconnaissance had found only four to five squadrons scattered across the area, mostly used for training and coastal patrols. The Fuhrer was quick to point out to Raeder the fact that recent modifications to five merchant ships would provide the Kriegsmarine with additional escort carriers whose fighter complement added up to 30 Bf 109s. Added to the Graf Zeppelin's aircraft, that numbered 40 fighters placing the American to German fighter ratio at roughly around 2:1. German aircraft had proven its supremacy time and again and American air forces would be disorganized coming from several air fields and could, likely, be intercepted before they became a problem. Second, landing anywhere in Virginia was ridiculous with the American troop presence so close to Washington. The invasion force would quickly find itself bogged down by soldiers already on alert and then pushed back into the sea. An attack further south would face minimal opposition allowing for an easier push inland and would also serve to draw off forces opening Washington to the joint forces of Rommel and Guderian leading to the fall of the capital and the end of the United States as a coherent entity.

"American forces are broken," Hitler stated. "All it will take is one more bold stroke to shatter their resolve. Our forces will walk over them to everlasting victory!"

As to the problems of landing craft, Hitler ordered German forces to begin confiscating all merchant and commerical craft in the occupied areas of Canada and New England. They had until summer 1944. Speed and surprise was essential.

The initial phase of the operation, the combined Luftwaffe/Kriegsmarine assault on Newport News in November 1943, served to drive the Atlantic Fleet south. It would be followed by numerous sorties to keep the Atlantic Fleet away from the proposed landing zones and to allow for aerial reconnaissance of the region. With naval success on the American east coast, Hitler ordered plans for an amphibious landing at Charleston to be sped up. He would travel to Philadelphia to set up his American HQ to oversee the Atlantic Theater, coordinating with Rommel, Guderian, Manstein, Goering, and Raeder. Training for the landing was conducted throughout late winter/early spring.

30 May 1944, Raeder initiated the invasion heading south from New Jersey. American forces would be ill-equipped to counter the coming attack, lacking in men and materiel. The American General Staff had become used to Raeder's roaming up and down the east coast over the past year in what was perceived as a useless blockade. Any threat the German Admiral offered, such as shelling of coastal ports, had been kept at bay by coastal aircraft which had markedly increased in northern Virginia. Also, after having overreacted to the joint Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine attack on Newport News, and with Rommel and Guderian to their west, American commanders were not willing to divert troops to the Carolina shores. In fact, they had diverted troops north to defend against a renewed drive by the Wermacht on Washington. The American Midwest and Washington took priority. Thus, South Carolina was not prepared for the German forces that stormed her shores, having been stripped of a vast amount of divisional strength and mostly used as a training area.

The Battle of Charleston began at 0300, June 6, with a naval barrage accompanied by bombing runs by the Graf Zeppelin's Ju-87s which would render the air strips at Myrtle Beach and Charleston Army Air Fields useless, grounding their squadrons and stripping air supremacy from American forces.
121,000 Wermacht troops ran ashore over the next five hours starting at 0630 in a motley collection of cruise ships, steamers, and other craft overwhelming limited American resistance in what quickly became a debacle for the American High Command. By the time USAAF air support could be called from nearby air fields in Florence and Charlotte, German troops had secured their beachheads and were driving inland. When USAAF forces arrived on the scene, what they found was mass panic. Numerous civilians clogged the roads trying to escape the German drive. What they did not know was that aircraft from the Graf Zeppelin and her escort carriers had been strafing and bombing American civilians in their exodus causing mass panic.

The German invasion of Charleston was only part of the Operation. Following the success of their spring campaign, Rommel and Guderian used the bulk of their forces to stab into West Virginia in a drive aimed at Washington itself meant to divert troops and attention away from South Carolina prior to the amphibious landings. This drive commenced in mid-May and reached as far as Moorefield, WV by June 6. Surprised by the ease of their eastward assault, Rommel and Guderian decided to press further than planned. The first line of defenses surrounding Washington would be shattered three days later.

Washington was in a panic. They had no immediate forces to counter the invasion in South Carolina, Rommel was less than thirty miles away, and the threat of losing the entire east coast was fast becoming a reality. Many voiced the opinion that Washington should be abandoned so that American forces could then focus on crushing the German forces at Charleston while maintaining a coherent defense against German forces from the north. President Dewey refused to abandon the capital citing its symbolic nature. Instead, he ordered that all forces in Virginia be focused on defending the capital while the fleet was to solve the problem in Carolina. Parts of the Pacific Fleet would be diverted east in the weeks to come while the bulk of the Atlantic Fleet was told to move north and engage the Kriegsmarine.

Admiral King issued the command for the Atlantic Fleet to remove the Kriegsmarine from the Carolina coast that the Wermacht in Charleston could be cut off and captured by I Corps. The decisive battle of the Atlantic unfolded June 12 between the Atlantic Fleet and the Kriegsmarine. Raeder was ordered by Hitler himself to hold his position at all costs. Raeder's naval aviators held the sky against American aircraft. The majority of the USAAF pilots were still trainees and quickly overwhelmed by the German aces who tore them apart. The two navies pounded one another across the sea taking numerous casualties. While Ju 87s and Fi 167s rained fire from above, Uboats attacked from the depths. Le Malin class destroyers glided through the churning waters blasting holes in American naval craft with elegant efficiency. Fiery pyres littered the ocean blazing brightly along the horizon.
American naval forces fought on despite their losses, realizing that South Carolina was likely lost if they retreated. Their determination was heroic and shocking to the German sailors who witnessed it. One remarkable event was the ramming of an American cruiser into one of the German escort carriers. Despite their efforts, they were overcome by the Kriegsmarine. Raeder pressed in for the kill virtually decimating the remains of the Atlantic Fleet as it finally turned to retreat south. The Grand Admiral would send his Uboats after them as he took up position off the coast.

SOURCE: Wilder, George Hitler's Great Gamble: The Amphibious Invasion of Charleston

Fall 1943 - Spring 1944

Following Rommel's pause to regroup in late October, America quickly set to work gathering forces for a counterattack. It was not soon coming. Armor and air were largely wrecked and rapidly being rebuilt while reserves of trained men were practically exhausted whether through injury, death, or capture following the failed campaigns against Rommel and Guderian, or were tied up elsewhere in garrison positions. The lack of troops was due to Garner's refusal to fund more than 8 divisions during his term. Dewey had fought to ramp up training in the early days of his administration but had only managed roughly 50 divisions by 1943.

This limitation of trained soldiers created problems. First there was the necessity of training, these men needed for cadres to prepare the next crop for battle. Second was the issue of keeping parts of the nation secure which led into the third, and most problematic, issue. Many regions, especially the West Coast, were against diverting troops from their borders. Legislators and Governors from California to Washington State lobbied to keep a sizable troop presence following numerous attacks by the Japanese on military installations, such as Ft. Stevens in Oregon, civilian facilities like those at Goleta, CA, or the largely undefended forests of the Pacific Northwest. Only luck had prevented a catastrophe thus far and many feared, should American forces be withdrawn, the Japs would pour across their shores much like they had at Hawaii, a traumatic event still recent in the minds of Americans. Hysteria gripped California worst of all with many believing an invasion was at most only weeks away. Their efforts served to hamper military operations in the country. In the end, Dewey was forced to draw troops from the relatively secure south.

Another problem which was becoming increasingly apparent was a drop in industrial output. The Germans had managed to knock out roughly one third of America's shipyards, one half of steel production, and were close to seizing the manufacturing core of heavy machinery in the country in its entirety. Manpower issues also arose as nearly every white male was pressed into uniform. Women and blacks were becoming the norm in factories and working hours were being extended, sometimes to the point that accidents became a regular occurrence. In the south, there was considerable anger that black men should work in close proximity to white women leading to strained tensions. This was not helped by the perception of southern troops that they were being singled out and shipped north as fodder.

As troops were being moved north for an offensive against Rommel, American plans were largely disrupted by Raeder and Goering's joint air/naval effort in mid-November on the coast of Virginia. Dewey's commanders feared it was the beginning of an amphibious landing meant to open a second front and quickly rerouted troops to the Atlantic shore. Despite this military presence, the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine left the naval yards at Newport News in ruins. The Kriegsmarine would remain a constant presence on America's East Coast, sometimes venturing as far south as the Carolinas disrupting American shipping and shelling cities. American commanders would wait until early January before once more planning for an offensive north.

Meanwhile, Goering turned his attention to Washington itself. Aerial bombings became the norm as American leaders debated whether or not to remain in the capital. Some believed the President should withdraw either south or west to safer territory to conduct the war. Dewey would not be swayed. If American citizens were to see him retreat, it would be disastrous for morale. American soldiers were used to ring the city against the expected German approach. They spent months digging fortifications.

To the north, German forces were becoming irritated with guerilla activity in their rear. American and Canadian partisans continually threatened their thinly stretched supply lines throughout the autumn and winter of 1943. What these partisans had not counted on were the brutal methods Heydrich would use to silence them. In one of the darker moments of the Atlantic War, Heydrich had the entire town of Malone, NY executed for aiding and housing partisans responsible for the murder of an SS man. Shock traveled throughout the state. Though many vowed vengeance, partisan activity noticeably dropped in the short term. This was followed by an intense search and seizure of all weapons from civilians in the occupied areas with threats of draconian punishment if any weapons were not registered and turned over to SS authorities. Heydrich also took to starving non-cooperative regions. This was not simply done to punish the locals but also because food stocks were not adequate for the occupied areas. German needs came first, the rest rationed amongst the populace. Many starved to death in the bleak winter of 43.

One shocking development that began in New England was American citizens of German heritage, both born and naturalized, stepping forward to join SS forces as valuable liasion officers. Of course, many of these men had been interned at the beginning of the war as security threats only to be later freed by Wermacht forces. Urged on by Kuhn, the appointed American leader of occupied America, they willingly joined the movement though their numbers were mostly in the hundreds. This "treasonous activity", as well as collaboration among the populace with their German occupiers, served to divide communities as no one knew who to trust.

A major blow for the American effort was also received in early 1944 when the United Kingdom formerly signed an armistice with the Japanese Empire. With their base in India lost, economic setbacks at home, and pressure on the domestic front over losses both territorial and human, PM Wood was forced to sue for terms. Australia would condemn Wood as a traitor for abandoning the war effort. With Britain out of the war and their lifeline to America cut off, many Aussies feared an invasion by Japan was soon to come.

What the Australians did not know was that, for all intents and purposes, Japan was through with the war. With peace achieved following the collapse of Chiang Kai-Shek's forces, Vlassov's truce, and Halifax's armistice, Japan's entire western border was safe. They held hegemony over a large swath of Siberia, China proper, Southwest Asia, and the Pacific as well as had an ally in India. Australia did not have the strength to force them back from New Guinea, and the United States was embroiled in a continental war with Germany. Also, Japan had found its shipping stretched to the limit and its troops too thinly distributed to even think of yet another invasion. There was a large enough problem holding what they now had. There were the aerial and naval attacks on Australia and the United States but these were to put pressure on both governments to sue for peace.

By April 1944, Rommel and Guderian were ready to resume their offenses aimed at meeting in Cincinnati.

SOURCE: Thackeray, Raymond The Eye of the Storm: The Lull in the American Campaign

The German Drive for Pittsburgh and Detroit

By the close of August 1943, the American pocket centered around Boston had been conquered putting virtually all of New England under German occupation. Rommel took the next few weeks to rest and resupply for the drive on Pittsburgh. Rommel's drive was slated for September 16, to be joined by a simultaneous drive south by Guderian aimed at Toronto and then Detroit.

When their drives commenced, Guderian discovered a distinct stiffening of Allied forces the further south he went. Allied forces had used the lull to build up their defenses. This was further aided by terrain. As the land narrowed at the approach of the Great Lakes, the Allies were able to concentrate their forces into tighter and tighter formations which would negate German maneuver. Toronto fell within the first week of Guderian's drive. After that initial victory, it was a slow, steady push into Allied territory.

Rommel made rapid progress through Northern and Central New Jersey, capturing Newark and then advancing into Pennsylvania within five days. Rommel diverted south, taking Philadelphia within the week and pocketing Southern New Jersey before moving west toward Pittsburgh, splitting off part of his forces to finish off what American forces remained centered around Atlantic City. The bulk of his forces would cross the Susquehanna River three days later. Patton waited at Harrisburg. The battle that followed lasted three days (October 3-6), Patton ultimately making a fighting retreat.

In Canada, Guderian ground his way through Allied lines. Paratroopers were used to secure the Blue Water Bridge against demolition. German losses were heavy as they struggled to hold onto the bridge against fierce American/Canadian assaults. When Guderian arrived, only one company remained of the battalion that had originally been dropped. The German position was further compromised by American naval forces sailing across the Great Lakes into the St. Clair River, firing at will on Guderian's forces and attempting to destroy the bridge the Wermacht were pouring across. Hundreds of Luftwaffe aircraft soared through the sky scoring hit upon hit on the naval aircraft lighting the night sky with pillars of flame. Veterans would later call it one of the most nightmarish days in the war. Death was everwhere, the cold autumn wind lashing the combatants. The bridge collapsed under repeated naval fire slowing the German drive by a week and effectively ending the battle. Guderian's engineers would work feverishly to repair the bridge achieving miraculous progress.

Tens of thousands of American troops rushed to halt Guderian's renewed thrust toward Detroit including naval recruits training on the Great Lakes. The ferocity of American attacks shocked Guderian who authorized the use of flamethrowers to push back Allied assaults. It was largely a disorganized affair, American forces accepting anyone able to carry a rifle into their ranks. But with the majority of American armor committed to Pennsylvania, Guderian rode down all opposition. Detroit fell on October 16. Guderian would mop up American forces throughout Eastern Michigan over the next month while preparing a drive on Indianapolis.

Rommel sped west against minimal opposition toward Pittsburgh. He reached the outskirts of the city on October 18. Once more, Patton waited for him. The Battle of Pittsburgh stretched for a week. An advantage Patton had that he had lacked in previous engagements with Rommel was air support. He had gathered every available squadron he could find after browbeating his way up the chain of command until he reached Eisenhower himself. The threat of losing nearly half of American steel production was enough to convince Allied commanders of Patton's need for aircraft and further supply. Across the sky and over the ground, German and Allied forces clashed shaking the very foundations of the Earth. With numerical superiority, Patton willingly sent wave after wave at Rommel from all sides. Planes fell across the field of battle, streaking like falling stars across the horizon. One Luftwaffe pilot crashed spectacularly into Loew's Penn Theater setting off a minor fire in the city. Rommel himself would recount in his memoirs "It was the most hellish experience of my life. It was as if the sky were falling and hell itself were opeing up, American soldiers screaming like demons as they ran toward us. Their eyes flared with hate."

When the tide of battle began to shift, Patton refused to retreat. If Pittsburgh were to fall, the blow to America would be enormous. He gambled everything, committing his reserves rather than retreating once again. Casualties were enormous for both sides. In the end, the battle came down to armor and air. The Luftwaffe gradually regained control of the sky, setting their sights on American ground forces. Patton's armor had been decimated by frequent charges at Rommel's lines. Despite his repeated shots, Wermacht forces held with their 88s. Now Rommel was ready to unleash his reserve. Patton found himself encircled. Only at great effort and loss of life did he manage to escape with a small contingent. The II Corps was no more.

Despite victory, Rommel's battle strength was shattered. He was left at 40% strength in armor and had suffered well over 50% casualties. He would not be ready for offensive operations for well over two months. Despite the losses, Hitler was ecstatic. The core of American steel was seized and a vast swath of American industry now lay in German hands or was destroyed. Further, Washington D.C. was now in striking range by air.

Despite their animosity, Raeder and Goering began planning a joint air/naval offensive aimed at the Newport News Naval Yards and Washington. With Luftwaffe support, the Kriegsmarine would once more venture into waters off Virginia in order to destroy the naval yard and then move on to attack America's capital. Occupation was not the goal. Destruction and fear were. With air reserves spent on the defense of Pittsburgh, all Washington had to defend itself was the weak Atlantic Fleet.

SOURCE: Williams, Trent Through the Gates of Hell: Autumn 1943

The Twin German Drives and an Atlantic Threat

Adolf Hitler flew to the Wermacht's Canadian HQ in March 1943 to meet with Field Marshal von Manstein to discuss the future of their American campaign. With American forces in disarray, Manstein was ordered by Hitler to split his forces for a drive west to capture Ottawa and a drive south towards New York City. Hitler believed that the fall of their capital would knock the Candians out of the war while the capture of NYC would serve a heavy blow to the American economy and cut off Massachussetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island which the Kriegsmarine could then effectively blockade. A subsequent use for Ottawa was for an eventual drive south past Toronto into Michigan aimed at Detroit. As to the future of the New York drive, Hitler intended to first mop up American forces in Massachussetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island and then push southwest toward Pittsburgh.

Manstein balked at splitting his forces when success was being achieved along the east coast. Manstein instead wanted to focus on a drive south aimed at Pittsburgh and then west into Ohio, Indiana, and finally Michigan. Hitler retorted that his plan was one giant pincer movement rather than a vulnerable scythe-like sweep. With success on the east coast and success in Michigan, the Wermacht could envelop Indiana and Ohio without a risk to its flanks. Also, Hitler's plan allowed for Detroit being captured early depriving America of one of its most important industrial and transportation hubs. It would also create a large pocket preventing a sizable number of American forces from escaping across the Mississippi River. Manstein would relent in the face of Hitler's adamant views. Rommel would be tasked with the drive south aimed at New York and then Pittsburgh. The drive west was given to Guderian. Manstein did this despite the protests of the General Staff. He realized the talents of Guderian and was not going to have them squandered by sycophants.

Loathed by the OKH for his independent streak and blunt language, Guderian had garned few allies in the upper echelons of German military authority. But the man got results and that was enough to keep his detractors at bay though promotion was another problem. Guderian realized the opportunity Manstein had given him and seized it with great enthusiasm. At the outset of his drive west, Guderian was surprised at the rapid progress he made. Canadian and American forces proved unable to counter his drive, their tanks poorly designed and their leadership amateurish. He would describe Allied battle techniques as blunt, savage, and simple using numbers to overwhelm and counter his forces when they could not outthink him. He also cited their lack of discipline, some units effectively crumbling at the thundering advance of his panzers. If not for supply problems, Guderian stated he could have taken Ottawa in two months. Instead, he would reach the Canadian capital by late August. PM King would declare it an open city. Following news of the Blitz in New York, King refused to have Ottawa's citizens suffer while the city was reduced to ruins. Hitler heaped great praise and awards on Guderian for his successful drive. The Fuhrer's lauding quickly turned to condemnation when PM King declared Canada would fight on.
Rommel's drive into the United States, meanwhile, intially met with the same success as Guderian. Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont fell within a month as Rommel and his Ghost Divisions stormed through New England. He entered New York via Granville on May 12. Meanwhile, there was a shake up of command in the American Army ranks.

Following the defeats of the U.S. II Corps by the Wermacht in the Canadian Campaign, General Dwight D. "Ike" Eisenhower wanted an assessment of the corps. After the losses of New Brunswick and the retreat into Maine, Eisenhower sent Major-General Omar Bradley to observe the conditions of the II Corps operationally.

On 16 April 1943, as a result of Bradley's report, Patton replaced Major-General Lloyd Fredendall as commander of the II Corps. Patton was also promoted to Lieutenant-General. Soon thereafter, Patton had Bradley reassigned to his Corps Command as deputy commander.

Tough in his training, Patton was generally unpopular with his troops. However, they preferred to serve with him because they thought he was their best chance to get home alive. US officers had noted the "softness" and lack of discipline in the II Corps under Fredendall. Patton required all personnel to wear steel helmets, even physicians in the operating wards, and required his troops to wear the unpopular lace-up leggings and neckties. A system of fines was introduced to ensure all personnel shaved daily and observed other uniform requirements. While these measures did not make Patton popular, they did tend to restore a sense of discipline and unit pride that may have been missing earlier. In a play on his nickname, troops joked that it was "his guts and our blood".

The discipline Patton required paid off quickly. Realizing Rommel's willingness to drive ahead brashly, Patton had his troops surrender ground in Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont to stretch Rommel's supply line, drawing him in and leaving him vulnerable on the flanks. By mid-May 1943, the counter-offensive of the U.S. II Corps began. At the Battle of Troy, Rommel was surprised by American forces. Patton pressed from the northwest threatening Rommel's flank using prototype bazookas to help him even the odds against German panzers, sowing confusion among the Wermacht's ranks. Only desperate action, personally led by himself, prevented Rommel from being cut off. The use of the 88s withering fire barely forced American armor back, sometimes at a distance of only fifty yards in what amounted to virtual hand to hand fighting. Patton sent wave after wave against the German line threatening a breakthrough at several points. Patton's success would be cut short. Luftwaffe forces were diverted from their assault on New York City to aid Rommel. With total air supremacy, the Luftwaffe straffed II Corps mercilessly sending the American drive into disarray. Patton would become legendary for standing up in his jeep at the approach of a Messerschmitt Bf 109 and pulling his pistol in a showdown. Soldiers watched in awe as the plane missed, Patton firing and cursing the pilot as he soared away.

Reluctantly, Patton withdrew to reorganize and plan. Rommel gained a great deal of respect for the general who blunted his drive and the American troops who proved their willingness and ability to fight. The German commander would not underestimate American military strength again.

Over the next two months, the generals would spar throughout New York until a decisive showdown in July at the Battle of New York, ten miles from the Bronx. Once more, air supremacy proved the deciding factor as Patton's forces were battered from above and by Rommel's forces across the field. II Corps would limp into New Jersey at only 50% strength. Patton became infamous in Washington for his missives demanding the USAAF develop something capable of "covering his ass" because he was tired of "Goering's fairies whipping it while he was trying to win a war."

President Dewey and his commanders had problems beyond Patton's. The Kriegsmarine had become emboldened by Admiral King's stretching of the American Atlantic Fleet along the East Coast. Grand Admiral Raeder was determined to seize control of the East Coast in order to both prevent the resurgence of American naval might, which was inevitable unless their ports and shipyards were either captured or destroyed, and to steal Hitler's attention away from Goering's posturing over the Luftwaffe's importance in razing NYC and saving Rommel's drive from defeat.
Raeder massed a strike force and made for New Jersey. Included in this group was the Graf Zeppelin which had recently arrived. Raeder's intent was to cut off King's northern fleet and decimate it before moving south to Virginia where he intended to draw off more of the Atlantic Fleet. Hitting so close to the capital of the United States would not only shake American resolve, it would also shut Goering up. Likewise, with the Graf Zeppelin, Raeder hoped to show the effectiveness of carriers to the Fuhrer in the hopes of reopening the Flugzeugträger program. He would then withdraw back to German controlled waters for a blockade of New England.

The first phase of Raeder's plan went perfectly. July 8, 1943, outnumbered and caught off guard, American naval craft north of Cape May were completely decimated. Raeder made excellent use of the Graf Zeppelin's aircraft for reconaissance and attack as well as Uboats to confuse American forces. Two American destroyers were sunk before Raeder's battleships even came within range. The sole survivor of the initial attack, the USS New York, was sunk as she fled south. Massachussetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut were essentially cut off for Rommel's eventual invasion.

Shock traveled throughout Washington. No one had expected the Kriegsmarine to make a move south so soon. Admiral King immediately called all available ships north to guard the capital. He also had all available aircraft put on alert.

Raeder, realizing the threat of American coastal aircraft, sought to draw the Atlantic Fleet away from Virginia. He shelled Dover, DE July 14 in order to draw King's attention. American aircraft did little damage as the Kriegsmarine retreated to open waters shortly after the opening salvos. A few days later, Raeder shelled Georgetown, DE. Once more, American aircraft did little damage as the Kriegsmarine slipped away. These hit and run missions would continue for the next two weeks sending citizens in the region into hysterics, as Raeder intended. He knew public pressure would eventually force the United States to respond.

By the end of July, Admiral King had gathered enough of the Atlantic Fleet together to push northward under Rear Admiral Arthur L. Bristol. He was given orders by King to find and, if possible, destroy the Kriegsmarine's strike force in detail. Should such occur, Bristol was given permission to venture north to relieve Massachussetts and attempt to disrupt the German's North Atlantic supply line. Only one aircraft carrier, USS Ranger, accompanied the American naval support force.

A picket line of Uboats off the coast of Delaware noticed the support force heading north and shadowed them, relaying information when possible to Raeder.

August 5, 1943, Raeder decided it was time to meet the enemy. He launched his entire complement of 20 Fieseler Fi 167 torpedo bombers and 20 Junkers Ju 87 dive bombers escorted by 10 Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters to seek out and destroy the USS Ranger as well as other parts of the Atlantic Fleet. The USS Ranger took priority.

The Graf Zeppelin's aircraft found the USS Ranger at 0714 hours. German aircraft caught the American force by surprise, hidden by the glare of the rising sun. A handful of American aircraft launched before the Kriegmarine's bombers arrived. Within half an hour the Ranger was a smoking wreck, taking on water, her flight deck pitted and useless. The German aircraft would also score hits on several other ships before returning to the Graf Zeppelin to rearm. They had suffered 2 Fi 167 dive bombers as casualties. All American naval aircraft were lost. The sky was Raeder's and he approached the support force for the kill.

What followed was the equivalent of a slugging match between the two forces. Though both fleets were roughly comparable, Raeder's aircraft tilted the balance. After suffering the loss of two cruisers and a destroyer, the Atlantic Fleet was ordered to withdraw back to Virginia. Raeder pursued them, sinking the battleship USS Texas, until the threat of coastal aircraft forced him to retreat.

The Atlantic Fleet suffered a bloody nose and would not resume offensive operations. Raeder, meanwhile, received accolades from the Fuhrer who was more than willing to begin the building of new carriers after the demonstration raeder had provided. Hitler also acceded to Raeder's opinion that the naval arm of the Luftwaffe should come under Raeder's command, citing difficulties had during the Atlantic campaign of trying to communicate with Luftwaffe commanders on the mainland. Goering fumed but had to accept it.

SOURCE: Klum, Roolf Raeder: Father of the Kriegsmarine

Operation WOTAN

By the end of June 1940, OKH sent Hitler a memorandum urging that the German Army’s principal aim should be the capture of Moscow by Army Group Center. The Fuhrer rejected that recommendation. He was working on Operation Wotan, a revolutionary offensive, and saw from the dispositions on the map of the Eastern Front the strategy he would follow. Soviet main strength was concentrated to the west of the capital and could be easily reinforced, making frontal assaults to capture the city from the west both costly and time-consuming. The Fuhrer recalled that during the Great War it became standard practice to infiltrate round the enemy’s flanks in order to attack an objective from the rear. His revolutionary battle plan would do just that. Faced by a strong defense west of Moscow he would withdraw the four Panzer Groups serving on the Eastern Front and concentrate them into a single Panzer Army Group. This he would unleash and send marching below Moscow and on an easterly bearing. At Tula it would change direction and thrust northeastward across the land bridge between the Don and Volga rivers before taking a new line and driving northwards to capture Gorki, some 400km east of the capital. After a short pause for regrouping, a coordinated attack by Army Group Center from the west and Panzer Army Group from the east would capture Moscow.

Stavka would certainly react violently when the panzer hosts thundered across the steppes but the Fuhrer would limit their ability to counter Wotan. He would launch massive offensives using the infantry armies on the strength of the three Army Groups. These would tie down the Red armies and prevent Stavka from moving forces to challenge Panzer Army Group’s thundering charge.

The longer the Fuhrer looked at the map the more confident he became that his plan could take Moscow well before October. He knew that the terrain of the land bridge between the Don and Volga rivers was good going for armor. The roads in the area were few and poor but the General Staff handbook considered that the sandy soil of the land bridge allowed movement even by wheeled vehicles off main roads and across country. The one caveat was that short periods of wet weather could make off-road movement difficult and longer spells could make the terrain impassable. The presence of so many rivers might slow the pace of the advance but that difficulty could be overcome by augmenting the establishment of panzer bridging companies with extra pioneer units. A revolutionary battle plan demands a revolutionary supply system and Hitler was convinced that he found one. Isolated even from his closest staff members he worked on the final details of Operation Wotan.
Hitler Choose Commander of Panzer Army Group
A telex sent on the morning of 2 July brought Field Marshal Kesselring to Hitler’s East Prussian headquarters. The commander of Second Air Fleet supposed he had been summoned to brief the Fuhrer on air operations on the central sector, but Hitler’s first words astonished him.

“I have decided to mount an all-out offensive for which all four Panzer Groups on the Eastern Front will be concentrated into a huge armored fist-a Panzer Army Group. This you will command.”

To Kesselring’s protests that he was no expert in armored warfare the Fuhrer replied that he did not want one. Such men were always too far forward and out of touch-Rommel in Army Group North, defying orders due to his great distance, was an example of the panzer commander. No, he needed an efficient administrator and he, Kesselring, was the best in the German Services.

The Luftwaffe commander then asked how Panzer Army Group was to be supplied and was told “by air-bridge”. The entire strength of the Luftwaffe’s Ju-52 transport fleet, all 800 machines, would be committed, and each machine would not carry only two tons of fuel, ammunition, or food but would also tow a DFS glider loaded with a further ton of supplies. Thus 2400 tons would be flown in a single “lift”. Hitler maintained that each flight would be so short that Ju pilots could fly three missions in the course of a single day and this would raise the total of supplies to 7200 tons daily; more than enough to nourish the Panzer Army Group in its advance.

“There will be losses. Aircraft will crash, others will be shot down…”

“And those losses will be made good.”

Hitler then went on to explain that in the event of a sudden emergency requiring even more supplies, ever motor-powered Luftwaffe machine would be put into service. Supplies would be dropped by parachute or air-landed from the Ju transports. Hitler’s remarkable memory recalled that ammunition boxes could be thrown from slow-flying transports at a height of four meters without damage but warned Kesselring that there was a high breakage rate-one on five-among the 250 liter petrol containers, unless these were specially packed. Once the panzer advance was rolling the Ju’s would no longer need to para-drop or air-drop the supplies but would land and take off from the salient which the Panzer Army Group had created. As the salient area expanded lorried convoys would be reintroduced. Aware of the vast amount of fuel that would be needed for the forthcoming operation, Kesselring asked what Germany’s strategic fuel reserves were and was told that these were sufficient for two to three months, including the requirements of Wotan.

Hitler’s hands, moving across the map on the table, demonstrated where the breakthrough would occur and then illustrated the drive towards Gorki. The momentum of the attack must be maintained by a pragmatic approach to problems and Kesslering was to ensure the closest liaison between the flight-controllers of both Services so that the pilots had no difficulty in finding the landing zones. It was the duty of the Luftwaffe to give total support to the Army by dominating the skies above the battlefield and ensuring that the group units were protected from attack at all times.

Hitler assured the Luftwaffe commander that the weather forecast was for hot, sunny weather which meant that ground conditions would be excellent. Operation Wotan should last no more than eight weeks so that the offensive would be in its last stages before the onset of the autumn rains, and would be concluded before winter set in. Long-range meteorological forecasts predicted that the present dry weather would continue until late in October.

The Fuhrer explained that Supreme Stavka had moved the bulk of its forces to counter the blow which they anticipated would be made by von Rundstedt’s Army Group South.

“We shall fox Stavka by maintaining pressure in the south but using mainly infantry forces. Stalin will have to reinforce that sector, whereupon Army Groups North and Center will each open a strong offensive. While the Soviets are rushing troops from one flank to another your Panzer Army Group will open Operation Wotan, will fight its way through the crust of the Red Army Divisions, and reach the open hinterland. From there the exploitation phase of the battle will begin and from that point you should encounter diminishing opposition. Of course, your advance will be contested but the presence of so great a force of armor behind the left flank of Westfront will unsettle the enemy. But the Russians, both at troop and at Supreme Command level, react slowly…so make ground quickly before they realize the danger you represent.”

Hitler then declared that once he had briefed the other senior commanders, planning for Wotan could begin. Because the individual Panzer Groups were at present committed to battle they could not be withdrawn and concentrated in toto. X-Day for each Panzer Group would depend upon how quickly it could be removed and regrouped but he though that they should all be ready to begin Wotan by 19 July. In answer to Kesselring’s concern that the infantry armies would bear the brunt of battle without panzer support Hitler stressed that a number of armored battalions and, possibly, some independent regiments would still be with the three Army Groups. He did agree that those panzer formations would have to act as “firemen”, rushing from one threatened sector to another.

In farewell, Hitler grasped Kesselring’s hands in his own, gave him the piercing look mentioned by so many of those who met the Fuhrer, and told him that Operation Wotan offered the armies in the East the chance of total victory within a few months, but only if each officer and man was prepared to give of his utmost for the duration of the offensive. National Socialist fanaticism, the Fuhrer concluded, would produce the victory that was within the Field Marshal’s grasp.

“Remember, Kesselring. The last battalion will decide the issue.”

On 3 July, in the Warsaw headquarters of Second Air Fleet, Kesselring addressed the leaders of the formation he was to command and told them that for the opening assault Panzer Groups Guderian, Hoth, and Hoepner were to attack shoulder to shoulder in order to create the widest possible breach. That breakthrough would be succeeded by the pursuit and exploitation phase which would produce a salient running up to Gorki.

“To create that salient,” said Kesselring, “Guderian and Hoth will form the assault wave, Hoepner and Kleist will line the salient walls, and in addition to that task will also defeat enemy attacks made against those walls and will replace losses suffered by the spearhead groups.

“Each Division has Luftwaffe liaison officers but at Panzer Group and Panzer Army Group level there will be a Luftwaffe Signals Staff unit to ensure total success in the matter of locating and supplying your units.

“I need not tell you how to fight your battles. You have grown up with the blitzkrieg concept, so any words of mine would be superfluous. We know our tasks. Let us to them and achieve the Fuhrer’s aim: victory in the East before winter.”

Hitler Briefs the OKH Staff
On Friday, 8 July, Hitler addressed the OKH staff. A summary of his briefing reads:

“The successes of the three Army groups now make Moscow the principal objective…Operation Wotan will open on 19 July and will consist of separate offensives by the infantry Armies of each Army Group as well as by a Panzer Army Group working towards the capture of the Soviet capital…The Panzer Groups will concentrate into the Panzer Army Group as they conclude present operations…

“Speed is vital…no pitched battles…strong enemy resistance is to be bypassed and left to the infantry and the Stukas to overcome. Panzer Divisions will consist of fighting echelons only…No second echelon soft-skin vehicle supply columns…Troops to live off the land as far as possible. Once the first issues of petrol, rations, ammunition, and spares are run down, subsequent supplies will be air-landed or air-dropped. The infantry formations serving with the Panzer Groups will foot march unless the railways can be put into operation to ‘lift’ them.”

The first withdrawals to thin out the panzer formations so that Wotan could open on 19 July were halted abruptly on the 18th, when the armies of Marshals Timoshenko and Budyenny opened “spoiling” offensives. These were incompetently handled and were defeated so thoroughly that only weeks later Budyenny’s South West Front had been destroyed around Kiev with a loss to the Russians of 665,000 prisoners. That defeat was followed by others at Vyasma and Briansk. The intensity of the fighting and the vast distances over which military operations were conducted during those encirclements tied up the Panzer Groups so completely that OKH’s intention to thin them out could not begin again until the last week of July. As a result concentration could not be completed simultaneously by all the Groups, and each went into what had now become the second stage of Wotan on various dates. Those Panzer Groups, urged on by a jubilant Hitler, were unrested, unconcentrated, under strength, and driving vehicles that needed complete overhaul but each advanced towards its start lines. It was 7 August, and it was fine and sunny.

SOURCE: Reich Historical Archives