The German Drive for Pittsburgh and Detroit

By the close of August 1943, the American pocket centered around Boston had been conquered putting virtually all of New England under German occupation. Rommel took the next few weeks to rest and resupply for the drive on Pittsburgh. Rommel's drive was slated for September 16, to be joined by a simultaneous drive south by Guderian aimed at Toronto and then Detroit.

When their drives commenced, Guderian discovered a distinct stiffening of Allied forces the further south he went. Allied forces had used the lull to build up their defenses. This was further aided by terrain. As the land narrowed at the approach of the Great Lakes, the Allies were able to concentrate their forces into tighter and tighter formations which would negate German maneuver. Toronto fell within the first week of Guderian's drive. After that initial victory, it was a slow, steady push into Allied territory.

Rommel made rapid progress through Northern and Central New Jersey, capturing Newark and then advancing into Pennsylvania within five days. Rommel diverted south, taking Philadelphia within the week and pocketing Southern New Jersey before moving west toward Pittsburgh, splitting off part of his forces to finish off what American forces remained centered around Atlantic City. The bulk of his forces would cross the Susquehanna River three days later. Patton waited at Harrisburg. The battle that followed lasted three days (October 3-6), Patton ultimately making a fighting retreat.

In Canada, Guderian ground his way through Allied lines. Paratroopers were used to secure the Blue Water Bridge against demolition. German losses were heavy as they struggled to hold onto the bridge against fierce American/Canadian assaults. When Guderian arrived, only one company remained of the battalion that had originally been dropped. The German position was further compromised by American naval forces sailing across the Great Lakes into the St. Clair River, firing at will on Guderian's forces and attempting to destroy the bridge the Wermacht were pouring across. Hundreds of Luftwaffe aircraft soared through the sky scoring hit upon hit on the naval aircraft lighting the night sky with pillars of flame. Veterans would later call it one of the most nightmarish days in the war. Death was everwhere, the cold autumn wind lashing the combatants. The bridge collapsed under repeated naval fire slowing the German drive by a week and effectively ending the battle. Guderian's engineers would work feverishly to repair the bridge achieving miraculous progress.

Tens of thousands of American troops rushed to halt Guderian's renewed thrust toward Detroit including naval recruits training on the Great Lakes. The ferocity of American attacks shocked Guderian who authorized the use of flamethrowers to push back Allied assaults. It was largely a disorganized affair, American forces accepting anyone able to carry a rifle into their ranks. But with the majority of American armor committed to Pennsylvania, Guderian rode down all opposition. Detroit fell on October 16. Guderian would mop up American forces throughout Eastern Michigan over the next month while preparing a drive on Indianapolis.

Rommel sped west against minimal opposition toward Pittsburgh. He reached the outskirts of the city on October 18. Once more, Patton waited for him. The Battle of Pittsburgh stretched for a week. An advantage Patton had that he had lacked in previous engagements with Rommel was air support. He had gathered every available squadron he could find after browbeating his way up the chain of command until he reached Eisenhower himself. The threat of losing nearly half of American steel production was enough to convince Allied commanders of Patton's need for aircraft and further supply. Across the sky and over the ground, German and Allied forces clashed shaking the very foundations of the Earth. With numerical superiority, Patton willingly sent wave after wave at Rommel from all sides. Planes fell across the field of battle, streaking like falling stars across the horizon. One Luftwaffe pilot crashed spectacularly into Loew's Penn Theater setting off a minor fire in the city. Rommel himself would recount in his memoirs "It was the most hellish experience of my life. It was as if the sky were falling and hell itself were opeing up, American soldiers screaming like demons as they ran toward us. Their eyes flared with hate."

When the tide of battle began to shift, Patton refused to retreat. If Pittsburgh were to fall, the blow to America would be enormous. He gambled everything, committing his reserves rather than retreating once again. Casualties were enormous for both sides. In the end, the battle came down to armor and air. The Luftwaffe gradually regained control of the sky, setting their sights on American ground forces. Patton's armor had been decimated by frequent charges at Rommel's lines. Despite his repeated shots, Wermacht forces held with their 88s. Now Rommel was ready to unleash his reserve. Patton found himself encircled. Only at great effort and loss of life did he manage to escape with a small contingent. The II Corps was no more.

Despite victory, Rommel's battle strength was shattered. He was left at 40% strength in armor and had suffered well over 50% casualties. He would not be ready for offensive operations for well over two months. Despite the losses, Hitler was ecstatic. The core of American steel was seized and a vast swath of American industry now lay in German hands or was destroyed. Further, Washington D.C. was now in striking range by air.

Despite their animosity, Raeder and Goering began planning a joint air/naval offensive aimed at the Newport News Naval Yards and Washington. With Luftwaffe support, the Kriegsmarine would once more venture into waters off Virginia in order to destroy the naval yard and then move on to attack America's capital. Occupation was not the goal. Destruction and fear were. With air reserves spent on the defense of Pittsburgh, all Washington had to defend itself was the weak Atlantic Fleet.

SOURCE: Williams, Trent Through the Gates of Hell: Autumn 1943

The Twin German Drives and an Atlantic Threat

Adolf Hitler flew to the Wermacht's Canadian HQ in March 1943 to meet with Field Marshal von Manstein to discuss the future of their American campaign. With American forces in disarray, Manstein was ordered by Hitler to split his forces for a drive west to capture Ottawa and a drive south towards New York City. Hitler believed that the fall of their capital would knock the Candians out of the war while the capture of NYC would serve a heavy blow to the American economy and cut off Massachussetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island which the Kriegsmarine could then effectively blockade. A subsequent use for Ottawa was for an eventual drive south past Toronto into Michigan aimed at Detroit. As to the future of the New York drive, Hitler intended to first mop up American forces in Massachussetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island and then push southwest toward Pittsburgh.

Manstein balked at splitting his forces when success was being achieved along the east coast. Manstein instead wanted to focus on a drive south aimed at Pittsburgh and then west into Ohio, Indiana, and finally Michigan. Hitler retorted that his plan was one giant pincer movement rather than a vulnerable scythe-like sweep. With success on the east coast and success in Michigan, the Wermacht could envelop Indiana and Ohio without a risk to its flanks. Also, Hitler's plan allowed for Detroit being captured early depriving America of one of its most important industrial and transportation hubs. It would also create a large pocket preventing a sizable number of American forces from escaping across the Mississippi River. Manstein would relent in the face of Hitler's adamant views. Rommel would be tasked with the drive south aimed at New York and then Pittsburgh. The drive west was given to Guderian. Manstein did this despite the protests of the General Staff. He realized the talents of Guderian and was not going to have them squandered by sycophants.

Loathed by the OKH for his independent streak and blunt language, Guderian had garned few allies in the upper echelons of German military authority. But the man got results and that was enough to keep his detractors at bay though promotion was another problem. Guderian realized the opportunity Manstein had given him and seized it with great enthusiasm. At the outset of his drive west, Guderian was surprised at the rapid progress he made. Canadian and American forces proved unable to counter his drive, their tanks poorly designed and their leadership amateurish. He would describe Allied battle techniques as blunt, savage, and simple using numbers to overwhelm and counter his forces when they could not outthink him. He also cited their lack of discipline, some units effectively crumbling at the thundering advance of his panzers. If not for supply problems, Guderian stated he could have taken Ottawa in two months. Instead, he would reach the Canadian capital by late August. PM King would declare it an open city. Following news of the Blitz in New York, King refused to have Ottawa's citizens suffer while the city was reduced to ruins. Hitler heaped great praise and awards on Guderian for his successful drive. The Fuhrer's lauding quickly turned to condemnation when PM King declared Canada would fight on.
Rommel's drive into the United States, meanwhile, intially met with the same success as Guderian. Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont fell within a month as Rommel and his Ghost Divisions stormed through New England. He entered New York via Granville on May 12. Meanwhile, there was a shake up of command in the American Army ranks.

Following the defeats of the U.S. II Corps by the Wermacht in the Canadian Campaign, General Dwight D. "Ike" Eisenhower wanted an assessment of the corps. After the losses of New Brunswick and the retreat into Maine, Eisenhower sent Major-General Omar Bradley to observe the conditions of the II Corps operationally.

On 16 April 1943, as a result of Bradley's report, Patton replaced Major-General Lloyd Fredendall as commander of the II Corps. Patton was also promoted to Lieutenant-General. Soon thereafter, Patton had Bradley reassigned to his Corps Command as deputy commander.

Tough in his training, Patton was generally unpopular with his troops. However, they preferred to serve with him because they thought he was their best chance to get home alive. US officers had noted the "softness" and lack of discipline in the II Corps under Fredendall. Patton required all personnel to wear steel helmets, even physicians in the operating wards, and required his troops to wear the unpopular lace-up leggings and neckties. A system of fines was introduced to ensure all personnel shaved daily and observed other uniform requirements. While these measures did not make Patton popular, they did tend to restore a sense of discipline and unit pride that may have been missing earlier. In a play on his nickname, troops joked that it was "his guts and our blood".

The discipline Patton required paid off quickly. Realizing Rommel's willingness to drive ahead brashly, Patton had his troops surrender ground in Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont to stretch Rommel's supply line, drawing him in and leaving him vulnerable on the flanks. By mid-May 1943, the counter-offensive of the U.S. II Corps began. At the Battle of Troy, Rommel was surprised by American forces. Patton pressed from the northwest threatening Rommel's flank using prototype bazookas to help him even the odds against German panzers, sowing confusion among the Wermacht's ranks. Only desperate action, personally led by himself, prevented Rommel from being cut off. The use of the 88s withering fire barely forced American armor back, sometimes at a distance of only fifty yards in what amounted to virtual hand to hand fighting. Patton sent wave after wave against the German line threatening a breakthrough at several points. Patton's success would be cut short. Luftwaffe forces were diverted from their assault on New York City to aid Rommel. With total air supremacy, the Luftwaffe straffed II Corps mercilessly sending the American drive into disarray. Patton would become legendary for standing up in his jeep at the approach of a Messerschmitt Bf 109 and pulling his pistol in a showdown. Soldiers watched in awe as the plane missed, Patton firing and cursing the pilot as he soared away.

Reluctantly, Patton withdrew to reorganize and plan. Rommel gained a great deal of respect for the general who blunted his drive and the American troops who proved their willingness and ability to fight. The German commander would not underestimate American military strength again.

Over the next two months, the generals would spar throughout New York until a decisive showdown in July at the Battle of New York, ten miles from the Bronx. Once more, air supremacy proved the deciding factor as Patton's forces were battered from above and by Rommel's forces across the field. II Corps would limp into New Jersey at only 50% strength. Patton became infamous in Washington for his missives demanding the USAAF develop something capable of "covering his ass" because he was tired of "Goering's fairies whipping it while he was trying to win a war."

President Dewey and his commanders had problems beyond Patton's. The Kriegsmarine had become emboldened by Admiral King's stretching of the American Atlantic Fleet along the East Coast. Grand Admiral Raeder was determined to seize control of the East Coast in order to both prevent the resurgence of American naval might, which was inevitable unless their ports and shipyards were either captured or destroyed, and to steal Hitler's attention away from Goering's posturing over the Luftwaffe's importance in razing NYC and saving Rommel's drive from defeat.
Raeder massed a strike force and made for New Jersey. Included in this group was the Graf Zeppelin which had recently arrived. Raeder's intent was to cut off King's northern fleet and decimate it before moving south to Virginia where he intended to draw off more of the Atlantic Fleet. Hitting so close to the capital of the United States would not only shake American resolve, it would also shut Goering up. Likewise, with the Graf Zeppelin, Raeder hoped to show the effectiveness of carriers to the Fuhrer in the hopes of reopening the Flugzeugträger program. He would then withdraw back to German controlled waters for a blockade of New England.

The first phase of Raeder's plan went perfectly. July 8, 1943, outnumbered and caught off guard, American naval craft north of Cape May were completely decimated. Raeder made excellent use of the Graf Zeppelin's aircraft for reconaissance and attack as well as Uboats to confuse American forces. Two American destroyers were sunk before Raeder's battleships even came within range. The sole survivor of the initial attack, the USS New York, was sunk as she fled south. Massachussetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut were essentially cut off for Rommel's eventual invasion.

Shock traveled throughout Washington. No one had expected the Kriegsmarine to make a move south so soon. Admiral King immediately called all available ships north to guard the capital. He also had all available aircraft put on alert.

Raeder, realizing the threat of American coastal aircraft, sought to draw the Atlantic Fleet away from Virginia. He shelled Dover, DE July 14 in order to draw King's attention. American aircraft did little damage as the Kriegsmarine retreated to open waters shortly after the opening salvos. A few days later, Raeder shelled Georgetown, DE. Once more, American aircraft did little damage as the Kriegsmarine slipped away. These hit and run missions would continue for the next two weeks sending citizens in the region into hysterics, as Raeder intended. He knew public pressure would eventually force the United States to respond.

By the end of July, Admiral King had gathered enough of the Atlantic Fleet together to push northward under Rear Admiral Arthur L. Bristol. He was given orders by King to find and, if possible, destroy the Kriegsmarine's strike force in detail. Should such occur, Bristol was given permission to venture north to relieve Massachussetts and attempt to disrupt the German's North Atlantic supply line. Only one aircraft carrier, USS Ranger, accompanied the American naval support force.

A picket line of Uboats off the coast of Delaware noticed the support force heading north and shadowed them, relaying information when possible to Raeder.

August 5, 1943, Raeder decided it was time to meet the enemy. He launched his entire complement of 20 Fieseler Fi 167 torpedo bombers and 20 Junkers Ju 87 dive bombers escorted by 10 Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters to seek out and destroy the USS Ranger as well as other parts of the Atlantic Fleet. The USS Ranger took priority.

The Graf Zeppelin's aircraft found the USS Ranger at 0714 hours. German aircraft caught the American force by surprise, hidden by the glare of the rising sun. A handful of American aircraft launched before the Kriegmarine's bombers arrived. Within half an hour the Ranger was a smoking wreck, taking on water, her flight deck pitted and useless. The German aircraft would also score hits on several other ships before returning to the Graf Zeppelin to rearm. They had suffered 2 Fi 167 dive bombers as casualties. All American naval aircraft were lost. The sky was Raeder's and he approached the support force for the kill.

What followed was the equivalent of a slugging match between the two forces. Though both fleets were roughly comparable, Raeder's aircraft tilted the balance. After suffering the loss of two cruisers and a destroyer, the Atlantic Fleet was ordered to withdraw back to Virginia. Raeder pursued them, sinking the battleship USS Texas, until the threat of coastal aircraft forced him to retreat.

The Atlantic Fleet suffered a bloody nose and would not resume offensive operations. Raeder, meanwhile, received accolades from the Fuhrer who was more than willing to begin the building of new carriers after the demonstration raeder had provided. Hitler also acceded to Raeder's opinion that the naval arm of the Luftwaffe should come under Raeder's command, citing difficulties had during the Atlantic campaign of trying to communicate with Luftwaffe commanders on the mainland. Goering fumed but had to accept it.

SOURCE: Klum, Roolf Raeder: Father of the Kriegsmarine